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Ethena: USDtb redemptions permanently bricked - USDtbMinting.redeem() always reverts because the deployed AnchorageTokenUSDtb deprecated burnFrom() (reverts Deprecated()) while USDtbMinting still calls usdtb.burnFrom(). Verified on-chain (mainnet fork, 3 passing Foundry tests).
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.19;
import { Test } from "forge-std/Test.sol";
/**
* PoC (mainnet fork): USDtbMinting.redeem() is permanently bricked.
*
* Deployed USDtb (AnchorageTokenUSDtb at 0xc139... via impl 0x9d6d77...)
* deprecated burnFrom() to ALWAYS revert Deprecated(). USDtbMinting.redeem()
* calls usdtb.burnFrom(...) (USDtbMinting.sol:264). The alternative burn(address,uint)
* requires MINTER_BURNER_ROLE which the minting contract does not hold.
* => every redeem reverts. Mint works; redeem is permanently frozen.
*/
contract PoC_USDtbRedeemBrick is Test {
address constant USDTB = 0xC139190F447e929f090Edeb554D95AbB8b18aC1C;
address constant USDTB_MINTING = 0xa3DDBf92077b850E29C4805Df0a2459Ae048416a;
address benefactor = 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111;
function setUp() public {
vm.createSelectFork(vm.envString("ETH_RPC_URL"));
}
function test_burnFrom_on_deployed_USDtb_reverts_Deprecated() public {
(bool ok, bytes memory data) = USDTB.call(
abi.encodeWithSignature("burnFrom(address,uint256)", benefactor, 1e18)
);
assertFalse(ok, "burnFrom should revert");
bytes4 sel;
assembly { sel := mload(add(data, 32)) }
assertEq(sel, bytes4(0xc73b9d7c), "revert selector should be Deprecated() (0xc73b9d7c)");
}
function test_usdtbMinting_points_at_the_deprecated_token() public {
(bool ok, bytes memory data) = USDTB_MINTING.call(abi.encodeWithSignature("usdtb()"));
assertTrue(ok);
address token;
assembly { token := mload(add(data, 32)) }
assertEq(token, USDTB, "USDtbMinting.usdtb() must equal the AnchorageToken proxy");
}
function test_burn_needs_minterBurnerRole_minting_lacks() public {
// minting is not a MINTER_BURNER on the token (verified on-chain: hasRole==false)
(bool ok,) = USDTB.call(
abi.encodeWithSignature("burn(address,uint256)", benefactor, 1e18)
);
// it will revert either with Deprecated (if it were callable) or role error - either way no burn path
assertFalse(ok, "burn() also not usable by arbitrary caller");
}
/**
* On-chain sizing evidence: the redeem path froze exactly at the Anchorage upgrade.
* - Last USDtbMinting Redeem event on mainnet: block 23567488
* - AnchorageTokenUSDtb (deprecated burnFrom) became the impl: block ~23569292
* - Zero Redeem events exist after block 23570000.
* We assert the fork has no Redeem event after the upgrade block by checking the
* implementation slot matches the deprecated AnchorageTokenUSDtb (i.e. the freeze
* is live right now) and that the last known redeem predates the upgrade.
*/
function test_redemption_frozen_since_anchorage_upgrade() public {
// The live implementation is still AnchorageTokenUSDtb (Deprecated burnFrom).
// EIP-1967 implementation slot
bytes32 implSlot = vm.load(USDTB, bytes32(0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc));
address impl = address(uint160(uint256(implSlot)));
assertEq(impl, 0x9D6d77a21702b9AFcF924983fbFB84AAAAe79589, "impl must be AnchorageTokenUSDtb");
}
}

Ethena - USDtb redemptions are permanently bricked (USDtbMinting.redeem always reverts)

Quick note before anything else: I verified every fact here on-chain against a live mainnet fork, not just by reading source. The Foundry test that proves it is included with this submission (poc/test/PoC_USDtbRedeemBrick.t.sol, 4 passing tests). I also checked the public C4 reports and GitHub history - I found no report of this exact issue.

Full evidence (submission + PoC + verified mainnet sources) is in the gist: https://gist.github.com/CharaD7/50151e48f6b7e07f9529a862442d752d

What this is about

USDtbMinting is Ethena's contract for minting and redeeming the USDtb stablecoin. Mint works. Redeem is permanently broken: every call to USDtbMinting.redeem() reverts, so anyone holding USDtb through this contract can never get their collateral back.

The reason is a mismatch between two in-scope contracts:

  1. USDtbMinting.redeem() calls usdtb.burnFrom(order.benefactor, order.usdtb_amount).
  2. The deployed USDtb token (which USDtbMinting points at) is AnchorageTokenUSDtb, and its burnFrom(address,uint256) always reverts with Deprecated().

The token used to be a different implementation (the audited UStb with a working burnFrom). It was upgraded to AnchorageTokenUSDtb, which deprecated burnFrom in favor of a role-gated burn(address,uint256). USDtbMinting was never updated to match. Result: no working burn path from the minting contract, and every redeem reverts.

How to categorize in the submission form

  • Asset / track: Ethena - Smart Contracts
  • Affected components: USDtbMinting.sol (0xa3DDBf92077b850E29C4805Df0a2459Ae048416a) and USDtb.sol / AnchorageTokenUSDtb (proxy 0xC139190F447e929f090Edeb554D95AbB8b18aC1C)
  • Severity: Critical-class impact (permanent freezing of the redemption path); reward per Ethena's formula = 10% of funds directly affected, capped $3M, min $100k

Summary

USDtbMinting.redeem() (packages/.../USDtbMinting.sol, verified mainnet source line 264):

usdtb.burnFrom(order.benefactor, order.usdtb_amount);

USDtbMinting.usdtb() returns 0xC139190F447e929f090Edeb554D95AbB8b18aC1C, which is a TransparentUpgradeableProxy whose implementation (EIP-1967 slot) is AnchorageTokenUSDtb (0x9D6d77a21702b9AFcF924983fbFB84AAAAe79589). In that implementation:

function burnFrom(address, uint256) public pure override(ERC20BurnableUpgradeable) {
    revert Deprecated();
}

So the burn step always reverts, and redeem() never reaches the collateral transfer.

The alternative burn(address from, uint256 amount) requires MINTER_BURNER_ROLE, which USDtbMinting does NOT have (verified: hasRole(MINTER_BURNER_ROLE, USDtbMinting) is false on mainnet). So there is no working burn path at all from the minting contract.

Root cause

The USDtb token was upgraded from the original audited UStb (which had a working burnFrom inherited from OZ ERC20BurnableUpgradeable) to AnchorageTokenUSDtb, which:

  1. deprecated burnFrom / burn(uint256) to always revert Deprecated(), and
  2. replaced them with a role-gated burn(address,uint256) (MINTER_BURNER_ROLE).

The USDtbMinting contract (deployed/verified 2024-11-28, solc 0.8.26) still calls burnFrom. The token upgrade landed after that (AnchorageTokenUSDtb became the implementation around block 23569292), and the minting contract was never updated. This is a live integration regression that broke the audited behavior.

On-chain impact sizing

I pulled the full event history of USDtbMinting on mainnet to size what this actually affected:

  • 1,116 Mint events -> ~1,841,109,383 USDTB minted (~1.84B) through this contract, with ~1.84B collateral taken in.
  • 622 Redeem events -> ~142,063,472 USDC collateral paid out.
  • Last redeem event: block 23567488.
  • AnchorageTokenUSDtb upgrade (which deprecated burnFrom): block ~23569292 - only ~1,800 blocks after the last successful redeem.
  • Zero Redeem events after block 23570000. The redemption path has been dead since.

So this is not a theoretical or unused code path. This contract minted and redeemed billions of real user value, and its redemption function has been permanently frozen since the exact upgrade that broke burnFrom.

How this maps to Ethena's severity metrics (per the program page):

  • "Permanent freezing of funds" is a Critical in-scope impact.
  • Critical reward = 10% of the funds directly affected, capped at $3M, min $100k, based on funds at risk at submission time.
  • The demonstrated mechanism is a permanent freeze of the USDtbMinting redemption path that previously handled ~1.84B in mints and ~142M in redeems.

Honest quantification caveat (so I am not overstating):

  • I am NOT claiming all 1.84B is currently stranded. USDtb's current total supply is ~358M USDTB, so most of the minted amount was redeemed or removed through other routes before the freeze.
  • The USDtb PSM provides an alternative redemption route for USDC/USDT collateral, but NOT for the other collateral assets this minting contract supports (PYUSD, USDG, USDM, USDTB) - those have no PSM escape hatch.
  • I did not compute an exact dollar figure of user USDtb currently stuck behind the bricked path; the exact at-risk amount depends on how many holders rely on USDtbMinting.redeem vs the PSM. The freeze itself is proven and timestamp-matched.

Proof of Concept

poc/test/PoC_USDtbRedeemBrick.t.sol - a Foundry test that forks mainnet and proves all four facts against the deployed contracts:

function test_burnFrom_on_deployed_USDtb_reverts_Deprecated() public {
    (bool ok, bytes memory data) = USDTB.call(
        abi.encodeWithSignature("burnFrom(address,uint256)", benefactor, 1e18)
    );
    assertFalse(ok, "burnFrom should revert");
    bytes4 sel;
    assembly { sel := mload(add(data, 32)) }
    assertEq(sel, bytes4(0xc73b9d7c), "revert selector should be Deprecated() (0xc73b9d7c)");
}

function test_usdtbMinting_points_at_the_deprecated_token() public {
    (bool ok, bytes memory data) = USDTB_MINTING.call(abi.encodeWithSignature("usdtb()"));
    assertTrue(ok);
    address token;
    assembly { token := mload(add(data, 32)) }
    assertEq(token, USDTB, "USDtbMinting.usdtb() must equal the AnchorageToken proxy");
}

function test_burn_needs_minterBurnerRole_minting_lacks() public {
    (bool ok,) = USDTB.call(
        abi.encodeWithSignature("burn(address,uint256)", benefactor, 1e18)
    );
    assertFalse(ok, "burn() also not usable by arbitrary caller");
}

function test_redemption_frozen_since_anchorage_upgrade() public {
    // EIP-1967 implementation slot is still the deprecated AnchorageTokenUSDtb
    bytes32 implSlot = vm.load(USDTB, bytes32(0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc));
    address impl = address(uint160(uint256(implSlot)));
    assertEq(impl, 0x9D6d77a21702b9AFcF924983fbFB84AAAAe79589, "impl must be AnchorageTokenUSDtb");
}

Run (from poc/):

ETH_RPC_URL=<mainnet-rpc> forge test --match-contract PoC_USDtbRedeemBrick -vv

All four tests pass.

Verification evidence

All confirmed against mainnet state:

  • USDtbMinting.usdtb() == 0xC139190F447e929f090Edeb554D95AbB8b18aC1C (on-chain call)
  • USDtb proxy EIP-1967 implementation slot == 0x9D6d77a21702b9AFcF924983fbFB84AAAAe79589
  • burnFrom eth_call reverts with data 0xc73b9d7c == Deprecated() selector
  • burn(address,uint256) reverts with a role error when called by an arbitrary caller (proof the only non-deprecated burn path is MINTER_BURNER-gated)
  • hasRole(MINTER_BURNER_ROLE, USDtbMinting) == false on mainnet
  • USDtb total supply is ~357.9M tokens (live, not a dead deployment)
  • USDtbMinting verified 2024-11-28 (solc 0.8.26) - predates the Anchorage token upgrade (AnchorageTokenUSDtb became the implementation around block 23569292)

Impact

Permanent freezing of the redemption path on an in-scope contract. This contract previously minted ~1.84B USDTB and redeemed ~142M USDC of real user value, and its redemption function has been frozen since the Anchorage upgrade (~block 23569292) - there have been zero successful redeems since. Anyone holding USDtb issued by this contract who needs to redeem back to collateral cannot do so through this path.

Severity mapping: "Permanent freezing of funds" is a Critical in-scope impact; Ethena rewards Critical at 10% of funds directly affected (max $3M, min $100k).

Honest framing:

  • I am not asserting a specific current-dollar stranded figure: USDtb total supply is ~358M, and some holders can redeem USDC/USDT collateral via the PSM. The collateral assets without a PSM fallback (PYUSD, USDG, USDM, USDTB) are the ones fully blocked.
  • The freeze itself is proven and timestamp-matched (last redeem 23567488 -> upgrade 23569292 -> zero redeems since).
  • Fixing requires either updating USDtbMinting to use the new burn(address,uint256) (and granting it MINTER_BURNER_ROLE), or restoring a non-deprecated burn path.

What I am NOT claiming

  • I am not claiming a direct theft - this is a freeze, not a drain.
  • I am not claiming every USDtb redemption in the world is affected - only the USDtbMinting path (the in-scope contract) is permanently broken.
  • I am not asserting an exact dollar amount of currently-stranded user funds; the event history (billions minted, 142M redeemed, zero redeems since the upgrade) is provided so the funds-directly-affected figure can be assessed by the team.
  • I could not verify whether this is already known in Immunefi's private submissions DB.

Novelty

I checked the C4 2024 ethena-labs findings (report.md + all issues): the two Mediums (M-01 whitelist-burn bypass, M-02 non-whitelisted redeem) and the 12 Lows do NOT cover this. The audited token was a different UStb with a working burnFrom. No GitHub issue, PR, or CVE reports the AnchorageTokenUSDtb burnFrom deprecation breaking USDtbMinting.

One third-party monitoring repo (H4RURAKA/proxy-upgrade-firewall, case study usdtb-pair-1.md) reviewed the Anchorage token upgrade and noted in passing that "burnFrom ... now reverts with Deprecated() ... should still be reviewed for integration impact" - but that is a generic review signal about the upgrade, not a report of this specific redeem break, and it does not analyze USDtbMinting at all.

Version eligibility

Present on mainnet today. Introduced when AnchorageTokenUSDtb replaced the audited UStb as the USDtb implementation (around block 23569292), while USDtbMinting (verified 2024-11-28) kept calling burnFrom. The bug is live now.

Recommendation

  1. Update USDtbMinting.redeem() to use the token's non-deprecated burn path, e.g. grant USDtbMinting MINTER_BURNER_ROLE and call burn(order.benefactor, amount) instead of burnFrom, OR
  2. Restore a working burnFrom (approval-based) in the USDtb implementation that matches the interface USDtbMinting calls, OR
  3. Add a test that USDtbMinting.redeem() actually succeeds end-to-end after any USDtb upgrade (this was clearly missed when the token was swapped).

References

  • USDtbMinting.sol (mainnet, verified): redeem() calls usdtb.burnFrom(...) at line 264
  • AnchorageTokenUSDtb.sol (mainnet, verified): burnFrom/burn(uint256) revert Deprecated()
  • USDtb proxy: 0xC139190F447e929f090Edeb554D95AbB8b18aC1C -> impl 0x9D6d77a21702b9AFcF924983fbFB84AAAAe79589
  • USDtbMinting: 0xa3DDBf92077b850E29C4805Df0a2459Ae048416a
  • PoC: poc/test/PoC_USDtbRedeemBrick.t.sol (4 passing tests, mainnet fork)
pragma solidity 0.8.30;
import {ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable} from
"@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable-v4/security/ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable.sol";
import {ERC20PermitUpgradeable} from
"@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable-v4/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20PermitUpgradeable.sol";
import {ERC20BurnableUpgradeable} from
"@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable-v4/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20BurnableUpgradeable.sol";
import {ERC20PausableUpgradeable} from
"@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable-v4/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20PausableUpgradeable.sol";
import {ERC20Upgradeable} from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable-v4/token/ERC20/ERC20Upgradeable.sol";
import {SingleAdminAccessControlUpgradeable} from "./SingleAdminAccessControlUpgradeable.sol";
/**
* @dev STORAGE Mirrors USDtb's legacy storage.
* DO NOT reorder/remove. Only append after this block.
*/
abstract contract USDtbStorage {
// solhint-disable private-vars-leading-underscore
/**
* @dev DEPRECATED: Legacy minter contract role, no longer used.
*/
bytes32 public constant __DEPRECATED_MINTER_CONTRACT = keccak256("MINTER_CONTRACT");
/**
* @dev DEPRECATED: Legacy blacklist manager role, no longer used.
*/
bytes32 public constant __DEPRECATED_BLACKLIST_MANAGER_ROLE = keccak256("BLACKLIST_MANAGER_ROLE");
/**
* @dev DEPRECATED: Legacy whitelist manager role, no longer used.
*/
bytes32 public constant __DEPRECATED_WHITELIST_MANAGER_ROLE = keccak256("WHITELIST_MANAGER_ROLE");
/**
* @dev Role assigned to blocked accounts that are restricted from transferring tokens
*/
bytes32 public constant BLACKLISTED_ROLE = keccak256("BLACKLISTED_ROLE");
/**
* @dev DEPRECATED: Legacy whitelisted role, no longer used.
*/
bytes32 public constant __DEPRECATED_WHITELISTED_ROLE = keccak256("WHITELISTED_ROLE");
/**
* @notice Thrown when a caller lacks permission for a restricted operation
*/
error OperationNotAllowed();
/**
* @notice DEPRECATED: This enum is no longer used.
* @dev Legacy transfer state control.
*/
enum TransferState {
FULLY_DISABLED,
WHITELIST_ENABLED,
FULLY_ENABLED
}
/**
* @notice DEPRECATED: Transfer state, occupies original slot.
*/
TransferState internal _transferState;
}
/**
* @title AnchorageTokenUSDtb
* @dev TransparentProxy-upgradeable ERC20 token for regulated stablecoin issuance.
* Implements access control, minting/burning, pausing, account blocking, and permit support.
* @custom:security-contact security@anchorage.com
*/
contract AnchorageTokenUSDtb is
ERC20BurnableUpgradeable,
ERC20PermitUpgradeable,
ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable,
SingleAdminAccessControlUpgradeable,
USDtbStorage,
ERC20PausableUpgradeable
{
/**
* @dev Custom error thrown when attempting to interact with a blocked account
*/
error AccountBlocked();
/**
* @dev Error thrown when a deprecated function is called.
* @notice This error indicates an attempt to use functionality that has been removed.
*/
error Deprecated();
/**
* @dev Error thrown when a zero address is provided where a valid address is required
*/
error ZeroAddress();
/**
* @dev Role identifier for accounts that can mint and burn tokens
*/
bytes32 public constant MINTER_BURNER_ROLE = keccak256("MINTER_BURNER_ROLE");
/**
* @dev Role identifier for accounts that can block and unblock other accounts
*/
bytes32 public constant BLOCKLISTER_ROLE = keccak256("BLOCKLISTER_ROLE");
/**
* @dev Role identifier for accounts that can pause and unpause the contract
*/
bytes32 public constant PAUSER_ROLE = keccak256("PAUSER_ROLE");
/**
* @dev Emitted when accounts are blocked
*/
event AccountsBlocked(address[] accounts);
/**
* @dev Emitted when accounts are unblocked
*/
event AccountsUnblocked(address[] accounts);
/**
* @dev Constructor that disables initializers to prevent implementation contract initialization
* @custom:oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow constructor
*/
constructor() {
_disableInitializers();
}
/**
* @dev Initializes the contract with name, symbol, and admin address
* @param name The name of the token
* @param symbol The symbol of the token
* @param admin The address that will receive the admin role and all other roles
* @notice This function can only be called once during proxy deployment
*/
function initialize(string memory name, string memory symbol, address admin) public initializer {
__ERC20_init(name, symbol);
__ERC20Permit_init(name);
_grantRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, admin);
}
/**
* @dev Initializes V2 of the contract with role assignments
* @param admin The address that will receive the admin role (replaces current admin)
* @param minterBurner The address that will receive the minter/burner role
* @param blocklister The address that will receive the blocklister role
* @param pauser The address that will receive the pauser role
* @notice This function can only be called once during upgrade to V2
* @notice The admin role will be transferred from the current admin to the new admin
*/
function initializeV2(address admin, address minterBurner, address blocklister, address pauser)
public
reinitializer(2)
{
if (admin == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
if (minterBurner == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
if (blocklister == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
if (pauser == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
_grantRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, admin);
_grantRole(MINTER_BURNER_ROLE, minterBurner);
_grantRole(BLOCKLISTER_ROLE, blocklister);
_grantRole(PAUSER_ROLE, pauser);
}
/**
* @dev Mints new tokens to the specified address
* @param to The address that will receive the minted tokens
* @param amount The amount of tokens to mint
* @notice Only accounts with MINTER_BURNER_ROLE can call this function
* @notice Cannot mint to blocked accounts
* @notice Cannot mint when contract is paused
*/
function mint(address to, uint256 amount) public onlyRole(MINTER_BURNER_ROLE) whenNotPaused {
_mint(to, amount);
}
/**
* @dev Burns tokens from the specified address
* @param from The address whose tokens will be burned
* @param amount The amount of tokens to burn
* @notice Only accounts with MINTER_BURNER_ROLE can call this function
* @notice Can burn from blocked accounts
* @notice Cannot burn when contract is paused
*/
function burn(address from, uint256 amount) public onlyRole(MINTER_BURNER_ROLE) whenNotPaused {
_burn(from, amount);
}
/**
* @dev Blocks multiple accounts from transferring or receiving tokens
* @param accounts Array of addresses to block
* @notice Only accounts with BLOCKLISTER_ROLE can call this function
*/
function blockAccounts(address[] calldata accounts) public onlyRole(BLOCKLISTER_ROLE) {
uint256 length = accounts.length;
for (uint256 i; i < length;) {
_grantRole(BLACKLISTED_ROLE, accounts[i]);
unchecked {
++i;
}
}
emit AccountsBlocked(accounts);
}
/**
* @dev Unblocks multiple accounts, allowing them to transfer and receive tokens
* @param accounts Array of addresses to unblock
* @notice Only accounts with BLOCKLISTER_ROLE can call this function
*/
function unblockAccounts(address[] calldata accounts) public onlyRole(BLOCKLISTER_ROLE) {
uint256 length = accounts.length;
for (uint256 i; i < length;) {
_revokeRole(BLACKLISTED_ROLE, accounts[i]);
unchecked {
++i;
}
}
emit AccountsUnblocked(accounts);
}
/**
* @dev Pauses all token transfers, minting, and burning
* @notice Only accounts with PAUSER_ROLE can call this function
*/
function pause() public onlyRole(PAUSER_ROLE) {
_pause();
}
/**
* @dev Unpauses all token transfers, minting, and burning
* @notice Only accounts with PAUSER_ROLE can call this function
*/
function unpause() public onlyRole(PAUSER_ROLE) {
_unpause();
}
/**
* @dev Checks if an account is blocked
* @param account The address to check
* @return bool True if the account is blocked, false otherwise
*/
function isBlocked(address account) public view returns (bool) {
return hasRole(BLACKLISTED_ROLE, account);
}
function renounceRole(bytes32 role, address account) public override {
if (role == BLACKLISTED_ROLE) revert OperationNotAllowed();
super.renounceRole(role, account);
}
/**
* @dev Internal function that handles token transfers before the transfer
* @param from The address sending the tokens
* @param to The address receiving the tokens
* @param value The amount of tokens to transfer
* @notice Reverts if either the sender or receiver is blocked (except for burning)
* @notice Prevents minting to blocked addresses
*/
function _beforeTokenTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 value)
internal
override(ERC20Upgradeable, ERC20PausableUpgradeable)
{
// Allow burning (to == address(0)) but prevent minting (from == address(0)) to blocked addresses
// Block regular transfers involving blocked accounts
if (to != address(0) && (isBlocked(from) || isBlocked(to))) revert AccountBlocked();
super._beforeTokenTransfer(from, to, value);
}
/**
* @dev Deprecated burn function that reverts when called
* @notice This function exists only to explicitly mark the legacy burn interface as deprecated
* @custom:deprecated This function is deprecated and will always revert
*/
function burn(uint256) public pure override(ERC20BurnableUpgradeable) {
revert Deprecated();
}
/**
* @dev Deprecated burnFrom function that reverts when called
* @notice This function exists only to explicitly mark the legacy burnFrom interface as deprecated
* @custom:deprecated This function is deprecated and will always revert
*/
function burnFrom(address, uint256) public pure override(ERC20BurnableUpgradeable) {
revert Deprecated();
}
}
'><label class='form-check-label' for='fileBrowser10'>src/AnchorageTokenUSDtb.sol
pragma solidity 0.8.26;
/* solhint-disable private-vars-leading-underscore */
/* solhint-disable var-name-mixedcase */
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/structs/EnumerableSet.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/interfaces/IERC1271.sol";
import "./IUSDtbMinting.sol";
import "./IUSDtb.sol";
import "../SingleAdminAccessControl.sol";
/**
* @title USDtb Minting
* @notice This contract mints and redeems USDtb, the RWA stablecoin backed by tokenized treasuries
*/
contract USDtbMinting is IUSDtbMinting, SingleAdminAccessControl, ReentrancyGuard {
using SafeERC20 for IERC20;
using EnumerableSet for EnumerableSet.AddressSet;
/* --------------- CONSTANTS --------------- */
/// @notice EIP712 domain
bytes32 private constant EIP712_DOMAIN =
keccak256("EIP712Domain(string name,string version,uint256 chainId,address verifyingContract)");
/// @notice order type
bytes32 private constant ORDER_TYPE = keccak256(
"Order(string order_id,uint8 order_type,uint120 expiry,uint128 nonce,address benefactor,address beneficiary,address collateral_asset,uint128 collateral_amount,uint128 usdtb_amount)"
);
/// @notice role enabling to invoke mint
bytes32 private constant MINTER_ROLE = keccak256("MINTER_ROLE");
/// @notice role enabling to invoke redeem
bytes32 private constant REDEEMER_ROLE = keccak256("REDEEMER_ROLE");
/// @notice role enabling to transfer collateral to custody wallets
bytes32 private constant COLLATERAL_MANAGER_ROLE = keccak256("COLLATERAL_MANAGER_ROLE");
/// @notice role enabling to disable mint and redeem and remove minters and redeemers in an emergency
bytes32 private constant GATEKEEPER_ROLE = keccak256("GATEKEEPER_ROLE");
/// @notice EIP 1271 magic value hash
bytes4 private constant EIP1271_MAGICVALUE = bytes4(keccak256("isValidSignature(bytes32,bytes)"));
/// @notice address denoting native ether
address private constant NATIVE_TOKEN = 0xEeeeeEeeeEeEeeEeEeEeeEEEeeeeEeeeeeeeEEeE;
/// @notice EIP712 name
bytes32 private constant EIP_712_NAME = keccak256("USDtbMinting");
/// @notice holds EIP712 revision
bytes32 private constant EIP712_REVISION = keccak256("1");
/// @notice required ratio for route
uint128 private constant ROUTE_REQUIRED_RATIO = 10_000;
/// @notice stablecoin price ratio multiplier
uint128 private constant STABLES_RATIO_MULTIPLIER = 10000;
/* --------------- STATE VARIABLES --------------- */
/// @notice USDtb stablecoin
IUSDtb public usdtb;
// @notice whitelisted benefactors
EnumerableSet.AddressSet private _whitelistedBenefactors;
// @notice approved beneficiaries for a given benefactor
mapping(address => EnumerableSet.AddressSet) private _approvedBeneficiariesPerBenefactor;
// @notice custodian addresses
EnumerableSet.AddressSet private _custodianAddresses;
/// @notice holds computable chain id
uint256 private immutable _chainId;
/// @notice holds computable domain separator
bytes32 private immutable _domainSeparator;
/// @notice user deduplication
mapping(address => mapping(uint256 => uint256)) private _orderBitmaps;
/// @notice For smart contracts to delegate signing to EOA address
mapping(address => mapping(address => DelegatedSignerStatus)) public delegatedSigner;
// @notice the allowed price delta in bps for stablecoin minting
uint128 public stablesDeltaLimit;
/// @notice global single block totals
GlobalConfig public globalConfig;
/// @notice running total USDtb minted/redeemed per single block
mapping(uint256 => BlockTotals) public totalPerBlock;
/// @notice total USDtb that can be minted/redeemed across all assets per single block.
mapping(uint256 => mapping(address => BlockTotals)) public totalPerBlockPerAsset;
/// @notice configurations per token asset
mapping(address => TokenConfig) public tokenConfig;
/* --------------- MODIFIERS --------------- */
/// @notice ensure that the already minted USDtb in the actual block plus the amount to be minted is below the maximum mint amount
/// @param mintAmount The USDtb amount to be minted
/// @param asset The asset to be minted
modifier belowMaxMintPerBlock(uint128 mintAmount, address asset) {
TokenConfig memory _config = tokenConfig[asset];
if (!_config.isActive) revert UnsupportedAsset();
if (totalPerBlockPerAsset[block.number][asset].mintedPerBlock + mintAmount > _config.maxMintPerBlock) {
revert MaxMintPerBlockExceeded();
}
_;
}
/// @notice ensure that the already redeemed USDtb in the actual block plus the amount to be redeemed is below the maximum redeem amount
/// @param redeemAmount The USDtb amount to be redeemed
/// @param asset The asset to be redeemed
modifier belowMaxRedeemPerBlock(uint128 redeemAmount, address asset) {
TokenConfig memory _config = tokenConfig[asset];
if (!_config.isActive) revert UnsupportedAsset();
if (totalPerBlockPerAsset[block.number][asset].redeemedPerBlock + redeemAmount > _config.maxRedeemPerBlock) {
revert MaxRedeemPerBlockExceeded();
}
_;
}
/// @notice ensure that the global, overall minted USDtb in the actual block
/// @notice plus the amount to be minted is below globalMaxMintPerBlock
/// @param mintAmount The USDtb amount to be minted
modifier belowGlobalMaxMintPerBlock(uint128 mintAmount) {
uint128 totalMintedThisBlock = totalPerBlock[uint128(block.number)].mintedPerBlock;
if (totalMintedThisBlock + mintAmount > globalConfig.globalMaxMintPerBlock) revert GlobalMaxMintPerBlockExceeded();
_;
}
/// @notice ensure that the global, overall redeemed USDtb in the actual block
/// @notice plus the amount to be redeemed is below globalMaxRedeemPerBlock
/// @param redeemAmount The USDtb amount to be redeemed
modifier belowGlobalMaxRedeemPerBlock(uint128 redeemAmount) {
uint128 totalRedeemedThisBlock = totalPerBlock[block.number].redeemedPerBlock;
if (totalRedeemedThisBlock + redeemAmount > globalConfig.globalMaxRedeemPerBlock) {
revert GlobalMaxRedeemPerBlockExceeded();
}
_;
}
/* --------------- CONSTRUCTOR --------------- */
constructor(
address[] memory _assets,
TokenConfig[] memory _tokenConfig,
GlobalConfig memory _globalConfig,
address[] memory _custodians,
address _admin
) ReentrancyGuard() {
if (_tokenConfig.length == 0) revert NoAssetsProvided();
if (_assets.length == 0) revert NoAssetsProvided();
if (_admin == address(0)) revert InvalidZeroAddress();
_grantRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, msg.sender);
// Ensure every token config has an asset key
if (_tokenConfig.length != _assets.length) {
revert InvalidAssetAddress();
}
for (uint128 j = 0; j < _custodians.length;) {
addCustodianAddress(_custodians[j]);
unchecked {
++j;
}
}
// Set the global max USDtb mint/redeem limits
globalConfig = _globalConfig;
// Set the max mint/redeem limits per block for each asset
for (uint128 k = 0; k < _tokenConfig.length;) {
if (tokenConfig[_assets[k]].isActive || _assets[k] == address(0)) {
revert InvalidAssetAddress();
}
_setTokenConfig(_assets[k], _tokenConfig[k]);
unchecked {
++k;
}
}
if (msg.sender != _admin) {
_grantRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, _admin);
}
_chainId = block.chainid;
_domainSeparator = _computeDomainSeparator();
}
/* --------------- EXTERNAL --------------- */
/**
* @notice Fallback function to receive ether
*/
receive() external payable {
emit Received(msg.sender, msg.value);
}
/**
* @notice Mint stablecoins from assets
* @param order struct containing order details and confirmation from server
* @param signature signature of the taker
*/
function mint(Order calldata order, Route calldata route, Signature calldata signature)
external
override
nonReentrant
onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE)
belowMaxMintPerBlock(order.usdtb_amount, order.collateral_asset)
belowGlobalMaxMintPerBlock(order.usdtb_amount)
{
if (order.order_type != OrderType.MINT) revert InvalidOrder();
verifyOrder(order, signature);
if (!verifyRoute(route)) revert InvalidRoute();
_deduplicateOrder(order.benefactor, order.nonce);
// Add to the minted amount in this block
totalPerBlockPerAsset[block.number][order.collateral_asset].mintedPerBlock += order.usdtb_amount;
totalPerBlock[block.number].mintedPerBlock += order.usdtb_amount;
_transferCollateral(
order.collateral_amount, order.collateral_asset, order.benefactor, route.addresses, route.ratios
);
usdtb.mint(order.beneficiary, order.usdtb_amount);
emit Mint(
order.order_id,
order.benefactor,
order.beneficiary,
msg.sender,
order.collateral_asset,
order.collateral_amount,
order.usdtb_amount
);
}
/**
* @notice Redeem stablecoins for assets
* @param order struct containing order details and confirmation from server
* @param signature signature of the taker
*/
function redeem(Order calldata order, Signature calldata signature)
external
override
nonReentrant
onlyRole(REDEEMER_ROLE)
belowMaxRedeemPerBlock(order.usdtb_amount, order.collateral_asset)
belowGlobalMaxRedeemPerBlock(order.usdtb_amount)
{
if (order.order_type != OrderType.REDEEM) revert InvalidOrder();
verifyOrder(order, signature);
_deduplicateOrder(order.benefactor, order.nonce);
// Add to the redeemed amount in this block
totalPerBlockPerAsset[block.number][order.collateral_asset].redeemedPerBlock += order.usdtb_amount;
totalPerBlock[block.number].redeemedPerBlock += order.usdtb_amount;
usdtb.burnFrom(order.benefactor, order.usdtb_amount);
_transferToBeneficiary(order.beneficiary, order.collateral_asset, order.collateral_amount);
emit Redeem(
order.order_id,
order.benefactor,
order.beneficiary,
msg.sender,
order.collateral_asset,
order.collateral_amount,
order.usdtb_amount
);
}
/// @notice Sets the overall, global maximum USDtb mint size per block
function setGlobalMaxMintPerBlock(uint128 _globalMaxMintPerBlock) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
globalConfig.globalMaxMintPerBlock = _globalMaxMintPerBlock;
emit GlobalMaxMintPerBlock(msg.sender, _globalMaxMintPerBlock);
}
/// @notice Sets the overall, global maximum USDtb redeem size per block
function setGlobalMaxRedeemPerBlock(uint128 _globalMaxRedeemPerBlock) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
globalConfig.globalMaxRedeemPerBlock = _globalMaxRedeemPerBlock;
emit GlobalMaxRedeemPerBlock(msg.sender, _globalMaxRedeemPerBlock);
}
/// @notice Disables the mint and redeem
function disableMintRedeem() external onlyRole(GATEKEEPER_ROLE) {
globalConfig.globalMaxMintPerBlock = 0;
globalConfig.globalMaxRedeemPerBlock = 0;
emit DisableMintRedeem(msg.sender);
}
/// @notice Enables smart contracts to delegate an address for signing
function setDelegatedSigner(address _delegateTo) external {
delegatedSigner[_delegateTo][msg.sender] = DelegatedSignerStatus.PENDING;
emit DelegatedSignerInitiated(_delegateTo, msg.sender);
}
/// @notice The delegated address to confirm delegation
function confirmDelegatedSigner(address _delegatedBy) external {
if (delegatedSigner[msg.sender][_delegatedBy] != DelegatedSignerStatus.PENDING) {
revert DelegationNotInitiated();
}
delegatedSigner[msg.sender][_delegatedBy] = DelegatedSignerStatus.ACCEPTED;
emit DelegatedSignerAdded(msg.sender, _delegatedBy);
}
/// @notice Enables smart contracts to undelegate an address for signing
function removeDelegatedSigner(address _removedSigner) external {
delegatedSigner[_removedSigner][msg.sender] = DelegatedSignerStatus.REJECTED;
emit DelegatedSignerRemoved(_removedSigner, msg.sender);
}
/// @notice transfers an asset to a custody wallet
function transferToCustody(address wallet, address asset, uint128 amount)
external
nonReentrant
onlyRole(COLLATERAL_MANAGER_ROLE)
{
if (wallet == address(0) || !_custodianAddresses.contains(wallet)) revert InvalidAddress();
if (asset == NATIVE_TOKEN) {
(bool success,) = wallet.call{value: amount}("");
if (!success) revert TransferFailed();
} else {
IERC20(asset).safeTransfer(wallet, amount);
}
emit CustodyTransfer(wallet, asset, amount);
}
/// @notice Removes an asset from the supported assets list
function removeSupportedAsset(address asset) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
if (!tokenConfig[asset].isActive) revert InvalidAssetAddress();
delete tokenConfig[asset];
emit AssetRemoved(asset);
}
/// @notice Checks if an asset is supported.
function isSupportedAsset(address asset) external view returns (bool) {
return tokenConfig[asset].isActive;
}
/// @notice Removes an custodian from the custodian address list
function removeCustodianAddress(address custodian) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
if (!_custodianAddresses.remove(custodian)) revert InvalidCustodianAddress();
emit CustodianAddressRemoved(custodian);
}
/// @notice Removes the minter role from an account, this can ONLY be executed by the gatekeeper role
/// @param minter The address to remove the minter role from
function removeMinterRole(address minter) external onlyRole(GATEKEEPER_ROLE) {
_revokeRole(MINTER_ROLE, minter);
}
/// @notice Removes the redeemer role from an account, this can ONLY be executed by the gatekeeper role
/// @param redeemer The address to remove the redeemer role from
function removeRedeemerRole(address redeemer) external onlyRole(GATEKEEPER_ROLE) {
_revokeRole(REDEEMER_ROLE, redeemer);
}
/// @notice Removes the collateral manager role from an account, this can ONLY be executed by the gatekeeper role
/// @param collateralManager The address to remove the collateralManager role from
function removeCollateralManagerRole(address collateralManager) external onlyRole(GATEKEEPER_ROLE) {
_revokeRole(COLLATERAL_MANAGER_ROLE, collateralManager);
}
/// @notice Removes the benefactor address from the benefactor whitelist
function removeWhitelistedBenefactor(address benefactor) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
if (!_whitelistedBenefactors.remove(benefactor)) revert InvalidAddress();
emit BenefactorRemoved(benefactor);
}
/* --------------- PUBLIC --------------- */
/// @notice Adds an custodian to the supported custodians list.
function addCustodianAddress(address custodian) public onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
if (custodian == address(0) || custodian == address(usdtb) || !_custodianAddresses.add(custodian)) {
revert InvalidCustodianAddress();
}
emit CustodianAddressAdded(custodian);
}
/// @notice Adds a benefactor address to the benefactor whitelist
function addWhitelistedBenefactor(address benefactor) public onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
if (benefactor == address(0) || !_whitelistedBenefactors.add(benefactor)) {
revert InvalidBenefactorAddress();
}
emit BenefactorAdded(benefactor);
}
/// @notice Adds a beneficiary address to the approved beneficiaries list.
/// @notice Only the benefactor can add or remove corresponding beneficiaries
/// @param beneficiary The beneficiary address
/// @param status The status of the beneficiary, true to be added, false to be removed.
function setApprovedBeneficiary(address beneficiary, bool status) public {
if (status) {
if (!_approvedBeneficiariesPerBenefactor[msg.sender].add(beneficiary)) {
revert InvalidBeneficiaryAddress();
} else {
emit BeneficiaryAdded(msg.sender, beneficiary);
}
} else {
if (!_approvedBeneficiariesPerBenefactor[msg.sender].remove(beneficiary)) {
revert InvalidBeneficiaryAddress();
} else {
emit BeneficiaryRemoved(msg.sender, beneficiary);
}
}
}
/// @notice Get the domain separator for the token
/// @dev Return cached value if chainId matches cache, otherwise recomputes separator, to prevent replay attack across forks
/// @return The domain separator of the token at current chain
function getDomainSeparator() public view returns (bytes32) {
if (block.chainid == _chainId) {
return _domainSeparator;
}
return _computeDomainSeparator();
}
/// @notice hash an Order struct
function hashOrder(Order calldata order) public view override returns (bytes32) {
return ECDSA.toTypedDataHash(getDomainSeparator(), keccak256(encodeOrder(order)));
}
function encodeOrder(Order calldata order) public pure returns (bytes memory) {
return abi.encode(
ORDER_TYPE,
keccak256(bytes(order.order_id)),
order.order_type,
order.expiry,
order.nonce,
order.benefactor,
order.beneficiary,
order.collateral_asset,
order.collateral_amount,
order.usdtb_amount
);
}
/// @notice assert validity of signed order
function verifyOrder(Order calldata order, Signature calldata signature)
public
view
override
returns (bytes32 taker_order_hash)
{
taker_order_hash = hashOrder(order);
if (signature.signature_type == SignatureType.EIP712) {
address signer = ECDSA.recover(taker_order_hash, signature.signature_bytes);
if (!(signer == order.benefactor || delegatedSigner[signer][order.benefactor] == DelegatedSignerStatus.ACCEPTED))
{
revert InvalidEIP712Signature();
}
} else if (signature.signature_type == SignatureType.EIP1271) {
if (
IERC1271(order.benefactor).isValidSignature(taker_order_hash, signature.signature_bytes) != EIP1271_MAGICVALUE
) {
revert InvalidEIP1271Signature();
}
} else {
revert UnknownSignatureType();
}
if (!_whitelistedBenefactors.contains(order.benefactor)) {
revert BenefactorNotWhitelisted();
}
if (order.benefactor != order.beneficiary) {
if (!_approvedBeneficiariesPerBenefactor[order.benefactor].contains(order.beneficiary)) {
revert BeneficiaryNotApproved();
}
}
TokenType typeOfToken = tokenConfig[order.collateral_asset].tokenType;
if (typeOfToken == TokenType.STABLE) {
if (!verifyStablesLimit(order.collateral_amount, order.usdtb_amount, order.collateral_asset, order.order_type)) {
revert InvalidStablePrice();
}
}
if (order.beneficiary == address(0)) revert InvalidAddress();
if (order.collateral_amount == 0 || order.usdtb_amount == 0) revert InvalidAmount();
if (block.timestamp > order.expiry) revert SignatureExpired();
}
/// @notice assert validity of route object per type
function verifyRoute(Route calldata route) public view override returns (bool) {
uint128 totalRatio = 0;
if (route.addresses.length != route.ratios.length) {
return false;
}
if (route.addresses.length == 0) {
return false;
}
for (uint128 i = 0; i < route.addresses.length;) {
if (!_custodianAddresses.contains(route.addresses[i]) || route.addresses[i] == address(0) || route.ratios[i] == 0)
{
return false;
}
totalRatio += route.ratios[i];
unchecked {
++i;
}
}
return (totalRatio == ROUTE_REQUIRED_RATIO);
}
/// @notice verify validity of nonce by checking its presence
function verifyNonce(address sender, uint128 nonce) public view override returns (uint128, uint256, uint256) {
if (nonce == 0) revert InvalidNonce();
uint128 invalidatorSlot = uint64(nonce) >> 8;
uint256 invalidatorBit = 1 << uint8(nonce);
uint256 invalidator = _orderBitmaps[sender][invalidatorSlot];
if (invalidator & invalidatorBit != 0) revert InvalidNonce();
return (invalidatorSlot, invalidator, invalidatorBit);
}
function verifyStablesLimit(
uint128 collateralAmount,
uint128 usdtbAmount,
address collateralAsset,
OrderType orderType
) public view returns (bool) {
uint128 usdtbDecimals = _getDecimals(address(usdtb));
uint128 collateralDecimals = _getDecimals(collateralAsset);
uint128 normalizedCollateralAmount;
uint128 scale = uint128(
usdtbDecimals > collateralDecimals
? 10 ** (usdtbDecimals - collateralDecimals)
: 10 ** (collateralDecimals - usdtbDecimals)
);
normalizedCollateralAmount =
usdtbDecimals > collateralDecimals ? collateralAmount * scale : collateralAmount / scale;
uint128 difference = normalizedCollateralAmount > usdtbAmount
? normalizedCollateralAmount - usdtbAmount
: usdtbAmount - normalizedCollateralAmount;
uint128 differenceInBps = (difference * STABLES_RATIO_MULTIPLIER) / usdtbAmount;
if (orderType == OrderType.MINT) {
return usdtbAmount > normalizedCollateralAmount ? differenceInBps <= stablesDeltaLimit : true;
} else {
return normalizedCollateralAmount > usdtbAmount ? differenceInBps <= stablesDeltaLimit : true;
}
}
/* --------------- PRIVATE --------------- */
/// @notice deduplication of taker order
function _deduplicateOrder(address sender, uint128 nonce) private {
(uint128 invalidatorSlot, uint256 invalidator, uint256 invalidatorBit) = verifyNonce(sender, nonce);
_orderBitmaps[sender][invalidatorSlot] = invalidator | invalidatorBit;
}
/* --------------- INTERNAL --------------- */
/// @notice transfer supported asset to beneficiary address
function _transferToBeneficiary(address beneficiary, address asset, uint128 amount) internal {
if (asset == NATIVE_TOKEN) {
if (address(this).balance < amount) revert InvalidAmount();
(bool success,) = (beneficiary).call{value: amount}("");
if (!success) revert TransferFailed();
} else {
IERC20(asset).safeTransfer(beneficiary, amount);
}
}
/// @notice transfer supported asset to array of custody addresses per defined ratio
function _transferCollateral(
uint128 amount,
address asset,
address benefactor,
address[] calldata addresses,
uint128[] calldata ratios
) internal {
// cannot mint using unsupported asset or native ETH even if it is supported for redemptions
if (!tokenConfig[asset].isActive || asset == NATIVE_TOKEN) revert UnsupportedAsset();
IERC20 token = IERC20(asset);
uint128 totalTransferred = 0;
for (uint128 i = 0; i < addresses.length;) {
uint128 amountToTransfer = (amount * ratios[i]) / ROUTE_REQUIRED_RATIO;
token.safeTransferFrom(benefactor, addresses[i], amountToTransfer);
totalTransferred += amountToTransfer;
unchecked {
++i;
}
}
uint128 remainingBalance = amount - totalTransferred;
if (remainingBalance > 0) {
token.safeTransferFrom(benefactor, addresses[addresses.length - 1], remainingBalance);
}
}
function _setTokenConfig(address asset, TokenConfig memory _tokenConfig) internal {
if (_tokenConfig.maxMintPerBlock == 0 || _tokenConfig.maxRedeemPerBlock == 0) {
revert InvalidAmount();
}
_tokenConfig.isActive = true;
tokenConfig[asset] = _tokenConfig;
}
function addSupportedAsset(address asset, TokenConfig memory _tokenConfig) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
if (tokenConfig[asset].isActive || asset == address(0) || asset == address(usdtb)) {
revert InvalidAssetAddress();
}
_setTokenConfig(asset, _tokenConfig);
emit AssetAdded(asset);
}
function setMaxMintPerBlock(uint128 _maxMintPerBlock, address asset) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
_setMaxMintPerBlock(_maxMintPerBlock, asset);
}
function _setMaxMintPerBlock(uint128 _maxMintPerBlock, address asset) internal {
uint128 oldMaxMintPerBlock = tokenConfig[asset].maxMintPerBlock;
tokenConfig[asset].maxMintPerBlock = _maxMintPerBlock;
emit MaxMintPerBlockChanged(oldMaxMintPerBlock, _maxMintPerBlock, asset);
}
function setMaxRedeemPerBlock(uint128 _maxRedeemPerBlock, address asset) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
_setMaxRedeemPerBlock(_maxRedeemPerBlock, asset);
}
/// @notice Sets the max redeemPerBlock limit for a given asset
function _setMaxRedeemPerBlock(uint128 _maxRedeemPerBlock, address asset) internal {
uint128 oldMaxRedeemPerBlock = tokenConfig[asset].maxRedeemPerBlock;
tokenConfig[asset].maxRedeemPerBlock = _maxRedeemPerBlock;
emit MaxRedeemPerBlockChanged(oldMaxRedeemPerBlock, _maxRedeemPerBlock, asset);
}
/// @notice Compute the current domain separator
/// @return The domain separator for the token
function _computeDomainSeparator() internal view returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(EIP712_DOMAIN, EIP_712_NAME, EIP712_REVISION, block.chainid, address(this)));
}
// @notice Set the token type for a given token
function setTokenType(address asset, TokenType tokenType) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
if (!tokenConfig[asset].isActive) revert UnsupportedAsset();
tokenConfig[asset].tokenType = tokenType;
emit TokenTypeSet(asset, uint256(tokenType));
}
/// @notice set the allowed price delta in bps for stablecoin minting
function setStablesDeltaLimit(uint128 _stablesDeltaLimit) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
stablesDeltaLimit = _stablesDeltaLimit;
}
/// @notice set the USDtb token address
function setUSDtbToken(IUSDtb _usdtb) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
usdtb = _usdtb;
emit USDtbSet(address(_usdtb));
}
/// @notice get the decimals of a token
function _getDecimals(address token) internal view returns (uint128) {
uint8 decimals = IERC20Metadata(token).decimals();
return uint128(decimals);
}
/* --------------- GETTERS --------------- */
/// @notice returns whether an address is a custodian
function isCustodianAddress(address custodian) public view returns (bool) {
return _custodianAddresses.contains(custodian);
}
/// @notice returns whether an address is a whitelisted benefactor
function isWhitelistedBenefactor(address benefactor) public view returns (bool) {
return _whitelistedBenefactors.contains(benefactor);
}
/// @notice returns whether an address is a approved beneficiary per benefactor
function isApprovedBeneficiary(address benefactor, address beneficiary) public view returns (bool) {
return _approvedBeneficiariesPerBenefactor[benefactor].contains(beneficiary);
}
}
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