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Economic Inquiry Most Recent Articles Feed
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<rss:image rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/pb-assets/journal-banners/14657295.jpg">
<rss:title>Economic Inquiry</rss:title>
<rss:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/pb-assets/journal-banners/14657295.jpg</rss:url>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14657295?af=R</rss:link>
</rss:image>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12740?af=R">
<rss:title>EASING THE CONSTRAINTS OF MOTHERHOOD: THE EFFECTS OF ALL‐DAY SCHOOLS ON MOTHERS' LABOR SUPPLY</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Low rates of female labor force participation (LFP) have been linked to the absence of childcare policies. This article examines the degree to which extending the school day by 3.5 hours in elementary schools, a large implicit childcare subsidy, affects LFP, the number of weekly hours worked, and the monthly earnings of females with elementary‐school‐age children. To do so, we exploit within‐individual variation in access to full‐time schools and a rotating panel of households that contains 12 years of individual‐level data on labor outcomes and sociodemographic characteristics. Results from long‐difference models show that extending the school day increases mothers' labor supply, increasing LFP by 5.5 percentage points and the number of weekly hours worked by 1.8. Moreover, these increases are accompanied by a raise in monthly earnings. (JEL I25, J13, J22)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
María Padilla‐Romo,
Francisco Cabrera‐Hernández
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12740?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Low rates of female labor force participation (LFP) have been linked to the absence of childcare policies. This article examines the degree to which extending the school day by 3.5 hours in elementary schools, a large implicit childcare subsidy, affects LFP, the number of weekly hours worked, and the monthly earnings of females with elementary‐school‐age children. To do so, we exploit within‐individual variation in access to full‐time schools and a rotating panel of households that contains 12 years of individual‐level data on labor outcomes and sociodemographic characteristics. Results from long‐difference models show that extending the school day increases mothers' labor supply, increasing LFP by 5.5 percentage points and the number of weekly hours worked by 1.8. Moreover, these increases are accompanied by a raise in monthly earnings. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; I25, J13, J22)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>EASING THE CONSTRAINTS OF MOTHERHOOD: THE EFFECTS OF ALL‐DAY SCHOOLS ON MOTHERS' LABOR SUPPLY</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12740</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-11-20T04:42:07-08:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12740</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12740?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12739?af=R">
<rss:title>WHAT DO BICYCLE HELMET LAWS DO? EVIDENCE FROM CANADA</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Twenty‐one states and the District of Columbia require youths to wear helmets when riding a bicycle, and there has been a push to extend such laws to adults. We provide new evidence on helmet laws by studying Canada using difference‐in‐differences models and restricted area‐identified public health survey data with information on cycling and helmet use for nearly 800,000 individuals from 1994 to 2014. We first confirm prior patterns from the United States that laws requiring youths to wear helmets significantly increased youth helmet use. We then provide the literature's first comprehensive evidence that “all‐age” bicycle helmet laws significantly increased both adult and youth helmet use by 50%–190% relative to pre‐reform levels, with larger effects for younger adults and less‐educated adults. All‐age helmet laws had modest effects at reducing cycling and increasing in‐home exercise during winter months among adults but did not meaningfully affect weight. Overall, our findings confirm that all‐age helmet laws can be effective at increasing population helmet use without significant unintended adverse health consequences. (JEL I18, I12, K32)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Christopher S. Carpenter,
Casey Warman
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12739?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Twenty‐one states and the District of Columbia require youths to wear helmets when riding a bicycle, and there has been a push to extend such laws to adults. We provide new evidence on helmet laws by studying Canada using difference‐in‐differences models and restricted area‐identified public health survey data with information on cycling and helmet use for nearly 800,000 individuals from 1994 to 2014. We first confirm prior patterns from the United States that laws requiring youths to wear helmets significantly increased youth helmet use. We then provide the literature's first comprehensive evidence that “all‐age” bicycle helmet laws significantly increased both adult and youth helmet use by 50%–190% relative to pre‐reform levels, with larger effects for younger adults and less‐educated adults. All‐age helmet laws had modest effects at reducing cycling and increasing in‐home exercise during winter months among adults but did not meaningfully affect weight. Overall, our findings confirm that all‐age helmet laws can be effective at increasing population helmet use without significant unintended adverse health consequences. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; I18, I12, K32)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>WHAT DO BICYCLE HELMET LAWS DO? EVIDENCE FROM CANADA</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12739</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-11-18T08:24:25-08:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12739</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12739?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12744?af=R">
<rss:title>ENERGY USE AND TEMPERATURE HABITUATION: EVIDENCE FROM HIGH FREQUENCY THERMOSTAT USAGE DATA</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Using micro‐level thermostat data from 27,000 U.S. households, we analyze how home heating/cooling decisions respond to weather. Responses are greater for extreme heat than for extreme cold and persist for at least 30 days after exposure, due in part to transaction costs but also to changes in intrinsic preferences. Failure to understand habit can lead us to overestimate the impact of short‐term policy nudges but underestimate the long‐run impact of small changes. Higher frequency estimates of how behavior responds to weather improve our understanding of climate adaptation as climate change affects not only mean temperatures but also variances. (JEL C55, D03, Q4)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Qi Ge,
Benjamin Ho
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12744?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Using micro‐level thermostat data from 27,000 U.S. households, we analyze how home heating/cooling decisions respond to weather. Responses are greater for extreme heat than for extreme cold and persist for at least 30 days after exposure, due in part to transaction costs but also to changes in intrinsic preferences. Failure to understand habit can lead us to overestimate the impact of short‐term policy nudges but underestimate the long‐run impact of small changes. Higher frequency estimates of how behavior responds to weather improve our understanding of climate adaptation as climate change affects not only mean temperatures but also variances. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C55, D03, Q4)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>ENERGY USE AND TEMPERATURE HABITUATION: EVIDENCE FROM HIGH FREQUENCY THERMOSTAT USAGE DATA</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12744</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-11-10T03:04:36-08:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12744</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12744?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12743?af=R">
<rss:title>GETTING INTO THE WEEDS: DOES LEGAL MARIJUANA ACCESS BLUNT ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE IN COLLEGE?</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This paper examines the effect of legal access to marijuana on student performance stemming from a voter‐approved initiative legalizing marijuana for those 21 and older in the State of Washington. Using panel data from a medium‐sized public university, we use a within‐student and within‐class estimator to show that legalization reduces students' grades, with an effect size about one‐half the impact of gaining legal access to alcohol. Consistent with how marijuana consumption affects cognitive functioning, we find that students' grades fall furthest in courses that require more quantitative skills. These effects are largely driven by men and low performers. (JEL I23, I18, K32)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Adam C. Wright,
John M. Krieg
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12743?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This paper examines the effect of legal access to marijuana on student performance stemming from a voter‐approved initiative legalizing marijuana for those 21 and older in the State of Washington. Using panel data from a medium‐sized public university, we use a within‐student and within‐class estimator to show that legalization reduces students' grades, with an effect size about one‐half the impact of gaining legal access to alcohol. Consistent with how marijuana consumption affects cognitive functioning, we find that students' grades fall furthest in courses that require more quantitative skills. These effects are largely driven by men and low performers. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; I23, I18, K32)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>GETTING INTO THE WEEDS: DOES LEGAL MARIJUANA ACCESS BLUNT ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE IN COLLEGE?</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12743</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-11-09T03:29:36-08:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12743</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12743?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12735?af=R">
<rss:title>THE ROLE OF NATIONAL DEBTS IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE YEN‐DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE</rss:title>
<dc:description>
An intertemporal optimization model is developed to examine the determinants of the long‐run nominal yen‐dollar exchange rate in the presence of national debts. The model is tested empirically using data from Japan and the United States. The proposed theoretical specification is well supported by the data and shows that relative national debts as well as monetary and financial factors may play a significant role in the determination of the long‐run nominal exchange rate between the yen and the dollar. (JEL F31, G11, G15)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Ioannis Litsios,
Keith Pilbeam
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12735?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;An intertemporal optimization model is developed to examine the determinants of the long‐run nominal yen‐dollar exchange rate in the presence of national debts. The model is tested empirically using data from Japan and the United States. The proposed theoretical specification is well supported by the data and shows that relative national debts as well as monetary and financial factors may play a significant role in the determination of the long‐run nominal exchange rate between the yen and the dollar. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; F31, G11, G15)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>THE ROLE OF NATIONAL DEBTS IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE YEN‐DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12735</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-11-03T12:39:51-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12735</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12735?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12738?af=R">
<rss:title>CHANGING BUSINESS MODELS IN INTERNATIONAL BANK FUNDING</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This paper investigates the foreign funding mix of globally active banks. Using BIS international banking statistics for a panel of 12 advanced economies, we detect a structural break in international bank funding at the onset of the great financial crisis. In their postbreak business model, banks rely less on cross‐border liabilities and, instead, tap funds from outside their jurisdictions by making more active use of their subsidiaries and branches, as well as interoffice accounts within the same banking group. (JEL C32, F65, G21)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Leonardo Gambacorta,
Adrian van Rixtel,
Stefano Schiaffi
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12738?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This paper investigates the foreign funding mix of globally active banks. Using BIS international banking statistics for a panel of 12 advanced economies, we detect a structural break in international bank funding at the onset of the great financial crisis. In their postbreak business model, banks rely less on cross‐border liabilities and, instead, tap funds from outside their jurisdictions by making more active use of their subsidiaries and branches, as well as interoffice accounts within the same banking group. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C32, F65, G21)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>CHANGING BUSINESS MODELS IN INTERNATIONAL BANK FUNDING</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12738</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-10-31T03:01:30-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12738</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12738?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12736?af=R">
<rss:title>SEPARATING BETWEEN UNOBSERVED CONSUMER TYPES: EVIDENCE FROM AIRLINES</rss:title>
<dc:description>
We propose an alternative approach to identify unobserved consumer types and assess whether firms price discriminate. Unlike other screening schemes that rely on quantity discounts or product differentiation, in our finite mixture structure individuals have unit demands and the product is homogeneous. We implement the model using an original U.S. airlines data set. The results support the existence of two demand types. The high‐type “business” traveler is less price sensitive, has a higher valuation, and pays a higher price than the low type “tourist.” The proportion of high types also increases as the departure date nears. (JEL C23, L93, R41)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Diego Escobari,
Manuel A. Hernandez
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12736?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;We propose an alternative approach to identify unobserved consumer types and assess whether firms price discriminate. Unlike other screening schemes that rely on quantity discounts or product differentiation, in our finite mixture structure individuals have unit demands and the product is homogeneous. We implement the model using an original U.S. airlines data set. The results support the existence of two demand types. The high‐type “business” traveler is less price sensitive, has a higher valuation, and pays a higher price than the low type “tourist.” The proportion of high types also increases as the departure date nears. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C23, L93, R41)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>SEPARATING BETWEEN UNOBSERVED CONSUMER TYPES: EVIDENCE FROM AIRLINES</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12736</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-10-31T12:03:48-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12736</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12736?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12737?af=R">
<rss:title>HYSTERESIS IN A NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This paper provides a simple, tractable way of incorporating “hysteresis,” in which persistent unemployment takes on structural characteristics, into a macroeconomic model. Hysteresis is modeled as deterioration in labor market matching efficiency as the average duration of unemployment increases. This is embedded in a basic New Keynesian macro model. A decline in labor market matching efficiency would be consistent with the observed rightward shift of the Beveridge curve since the 2007–2009 recession. Hysteresis is shown to lead to larger and more persistent responses of the unemployment rate and unemployment duration to productivity, intertemporal preference, and monetary shocks. Hysteresis also generates an increase in the natural rate of unemployment. (JEL E24, J64, E32)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
William D. Craighead
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12737?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This paper provides a simple, tractable way of incorporating “hysteresis,” in which persistent unemployment takes on structural characteristics, into a macroeconomic model. Hysteresis is modeled as deterioration in labor market matching efficiency as the average duration of unemployment increases. This is embedded in a basic New Keynesian macro model. A decline in labor market matching efficiency would be consistent with the observed rightward shift of the Beveridge curve since the 2007–2009 recession. Hysteresis is shown to lead to larger and more persistent responses of the unemployment rate and unemployment duration to productivity, intertemporal preference, and monetary shocks. Hysteresis also generates an increase in the natural rate of unemployment. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; E24, J64, E32)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>HYSTERESIS IN A NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12737</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-10-30T10:54:50-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12737</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12737?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12733?af=R">
<rss:title>EXAMINING THE EXTERNALITY OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ON CHILDREN'S EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT</rss:title>
<dc:description>
I exploit differences in the generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits across states and over time to investigate the link between UI and children's academic achievement. Estimates show that a 1% increase in maximum weekly UI benefits reduces the probability that a child repeats a grade by around 0.03 percentage points. The effect is concentrated among children of low‐ and middle‐income families. This paper's findings, which are the first in the literature to show evidence of a positive effect of UI on children's educational outcomes, provide insight into the role of UI in the human capital accumulation of children. (JEL I20, I38, J65)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Krishna Regmi
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12733?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;I exploit differences in the generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits across states and over time to investigate the link between UI and children's academic achievement. Estimates show that a 1% increase in maximum weekly UI benefits reduces the probability that a child repeats a grade by around 0.03 percentage points. The effect is concentrated among children of low‐ and middle‐income families. This paper's findings, which are the first in the literature to show evidence of a positive effect of UI on children's educational outcomes, provide insight into the role of UI in the human capital accumulation of children. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; I20, I38, J65)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>EXAMINING THE EXTERNALITY OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ON CHILDREN'S EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12733</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-10-14T08:58:40-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12733</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12733?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12731?af=R">
<rss:title>INFORMING RETIREMENT SAVINGS DECISIONS: A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON SUPPLEMENTAL PLANS</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Although supplemental saving plans can be an important part of an individual's financial security in retirement, contribution rates remain low, particularly among those with lower salaries and less education. We report findings from an intervention that provided information on key aspects of the employer‐provided supplemental saving plans to older public employees in North Carolina. Among workers participating in a supplemental plan, individuals who received an informational flyer increased their contributions in the months following the intervention relative to the control group. In contrast, individuals who were not enrolled in a retirement saving plan were not moved to begin contributing to a supplemental plan. The results suggest that informational interventions can induce workers who are already engaged in the saving process to reassess their level of retirement preparedness. (JEL C93, D14, D9)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Robert L. Clark,
Robert G. Hammond,
Melinda S. Morrill,
Christelle Khalaf
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12731?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Although supplemental saving plans can be an important part of an individual's financial security in retirement, contribution rates remain low, particularly among those with lower salaries and less education. We report findings from an intervention that provided information on key aspects of the employer‐provided supplemental saving plans to older public employees in North Carolina. Among workers participating in a supplemental plan, individuals who received an informational flyer increased their contributions in the months following the intervention relative to the control group. In contrast, individuals who were not enrolled in a retirement saving plan were not moved to begin contributing to a supplemental plan. The results suggest that informational interventions can induce workers who are already engaged in the saving process to reassess their level of retirement preparedness. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C93, D14, D9)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>INFORMING RETIREMENT SAVINGS DECISIONS: A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON SUPPLEMENTAL PLANS</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12731</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-10-12T09:14:37-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12731</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12731?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12734?af=R">
<rss:title>THE LOCAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A LARGE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY: EVIDENCE FROM UC MERCED</rss:title>
<dc:description>
In this paper, I estimate the short‐run economic effects of the opening of The University of California, Merced in 2005 by comparing Merced with a counterfactual constructed by the synthetic control method. During the period 2005–2014, the opening of the campus has increased local employment by 13%, mainly in nontraded industries, such as the service sector. These findings suggest that a large research university could bring immediate benefits to the local economy because of its large demand from students and employees. (JEL J24, O18, R11)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Jongkwan Lee
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12734?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;In this paper, I estimate the short‐run economic effects of the opening of The University of California, Merced in 2005 by comparing Merced with a counterfactual constructed by the synthetic control method. During the period 2005–2014, the opening of the campus has increased local employment by 13%, mainly in nontraded industries, such as the service sector. These findings suggest that a large research university could bring immediate benefits to the local economy because of its large demand from students and employees. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; J24, O18, R11)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>THE LOCAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A LARGE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY: EVIDENCE FROM UC MERCED</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12734</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-10-12T05:54:33-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12734</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12734?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12711?af=R">
<rss:title>FACTOR AUGMENTATION, FACTOR ELIMINATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Economic growth theory distinguishes between reproducible and nonreproducible factors of production. In traditional growth models based on factor‐augmenting technical change, perpetual economic growth requires that each essential nonreproducible factor, such as labor, be augmented by a reproducible factor, such as human capital. Recent models of factor‐eliminating technical change deliver perpetual growth by eliminating the nonreproducible factors. Heretofore, the literature has kept factor augmentation and factor elimination separate. We analyze a model with both. The model generalizes the traditional factor augmentation approach by relaxing the usual restriction that factor elimination is absent. We obtain the striking result that factor‐augmenting technical change is a misspecification when factor‐eliminating technical change is present. The result raises several questions about technical change and endogenous growth. (JEL O41, O31, O33)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
John Seater,
Karine Yenokyan
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12711?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Economic growth theory distinguishes between reproducible and nonreproducible factors of production. In traditional growth models based on factor‐augmenting technical change, perpetual economic growth requires that each essential nonreproducible factor, such as labor, be augmented by a reproducible factor, such as human capital. Recent models of factor‐eliminating technical change deliver perpetual growth by eliminating the nonreproducible factors. Heretofore, the literature has kept factor augmentation and factor elimination separate. We analyze a model with both. The model generalizes the traditional factor augmentation approach by relaxing the usual restriction that factor elimination is absent. We obtain the striking result that factor‐augmenting technical change is a misspecification when factor‐eliminating technical change is present. The result raises several questions about technical change and endogenous growth. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; O41, O31, O33)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>FACTOR AUGMENTATION, FACTOR ELIMINATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12711</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-10-11T10:44:06-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12711</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12711?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12732?af=R">
<rss:title>A SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: HETEROGENEOUS WELFARE AND MIGRATION EFFECTS FROM THE SINGLE MARKET AND THE BREXIT</rss:title>
<dc:description>
We use a quantitative model to study the implications of European integration for welfare and net migration flows across 1,280 European regions. The model suggests that an increase of trade barriers to the level of 1957 reduces welfare by about 5%–8% on average, depending on the presumed trade elasticity. However, remote regions may face initial welfare losses of up to 10%. These heterogeneous welfare effects cause estimated net migration of 1.9% of the population to the European geographic center implying that the dismantling of trade barriers in Europe has led to a more homogeneous spatial distribution of economic activity. With regard to the Brexit, we find moderate welfare losses for the United Kingdom of 1.05% in the most pessimistic scenario while continental Europe's welfare declines by 0.41%. (JEL F15, R12, R13, R23)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Marcel Henkel,
Tobias Seidel
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12732?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;We use a quantitative model to study the implications of European integration for welfare and net migration flows across 1,280 European regions. The model suggests that an increase of trade barriers to the level of 1957 reduces welfare by about 5%–8% on average, depending on the presumed trade elasticity. However, remote regions may face initial welfare losses of up to 10%. These heterogeneous welfare effects cause estimated net migration of 1.9% of the population to the European geographic center implying that the dismantling of trade barriers in Europe has led to a more homogeneous spatial distribution of economic activity. With regard to the Brexit, we find moderate welfare losses for the United Kingdom of 1.05% in the most pessimistic scenario while continental Europe's welfare declines by 0.41%. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; F15, R12, R13, R23)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>A SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: HETEROGENEOUS WELFARE AND MIGRATION EFFECTS FROM THE SINGLE MARKET AND THE BREXIT</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12732</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-10-10T08:43:03-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12732</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12732?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12727?af=R">
<rss:title>CULTURAL IDENTITIES AND RESOLUTION OF SOCIAL DILEMMAS</rss:title>
<dc:description>
We report an experiment on payoff‐equivalent, sequential provision and appropriation games with high‐ and low‐caste Indian villagers. A central question is whether caste identities affect resolution of social dilemmas. Making caste salient elicits striking changes in behavior compared to baseline treatment with no information about others' castes. Homogenous groups with high caste villagers are more successful in resolving social dilemmas than homogenous groups with low caste villagers. The success of mixed‐caste groups is somewhere between, which is inconsistent with a group identity model. Absent salient information on caste, behavior is inconsistent with unconditional social preferences but as predicted by reciprocity. (JEL C93, H41, Z13)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
James C. Cox,
Vjollca Sadiraj,
Urmimala Sen
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12727?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;We report an experiment on payoff‐equivalent, sequential provision and appropriation games with high‐ and low‐caste Indian villagers. A central question is whether caste identities affect resolution of social dilemmas. Making caste salient elicits striking changes in behavior compared to baseline treatment with no information about others' castes. Homogenous groups with high caste villagers are more successful in resolving social dilemmas than homogenous groups with low caste villagers. The success of mixed‐caste groups is somewhere between, which is inconsistent with a group identity model. Absent salient information on caste, behavior is inconsistent with unconditional social preferences but as predicted by reciprocity. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C93, H41, Z13)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>CULTURAL IDENTITIES AND RESOLUTION OF SOCIAL DILEMMAS</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12727</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-10-08T12:29:43-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12727</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12727?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12730?af=R">
<rss:title>TIME‐USE AND ACADEMIC PEER EFFECTS IN COLLEGE</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This paper examines academic peer effects in college. Unique new data from the Berea Panel Study allow us to focus on a mechanism wherein a student's peers affect her achievement by changing her study effort. Although the potential relevance of this mechanism has been recognized, data limitations have made it difficult to provide direct evidence about its importance. We find that a student's freshman grade point average is affected by the amount her peers studied in high school, suggesting the importance of this mechanism. Using time diary information, we confirm that college study time is actually being affected. (JEL I20, F21, J01)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Nirav Mehta,
Ralph Stinebrickner,
Todd Stinebrickner
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12730?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This paper examines academic peer effects in college. Unique new data from the Berea Panel Study allow us to focus on a mechanism wherein a student's peers affect her achievement by changing her study effort. Although the potential relevance of this mechanism has been recognized, data limitations have made it difficult to provide direct evidence about its importance. We find that a student's freshman grade point average is affected by the amount her peers studied in high school, suggesting the importance of this mechanism. Using time diary information, we confirm that college study time is actually being affected. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; I20, F21, J01)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>TIME‐USE AND ACADEMIC PEER EFFECTS IN COLLEGE</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12730</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-10-08T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12730</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12730?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12729?af=R">
<rss:title>WEIGHING THE MILITARY OPTION: THE EFFECTS OF WARTIME CONDITIONS ON INVESTMENTS IN HUMAN CAPITAL</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Serving in the military is an important vehicle through which young Americans invest in their human capital. As such, changes in the desirability of military service may affect the attainment of enlistment requirements, such as a high school degree or equivalent. Using American Community Survey data, we find that exposure to home‐state combat fatalities during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars decreased the probability of high school completion, and increased the probability of general equivalency diploma completion. Using military data, we confirm that exposure to home‐state fatalities selectively deterred some individuals from enlisting. The results suggest military service and educational investments are complements. (JEL I20, I26, J24)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Brian Duncan,
Hani Mansour,
Bryson Rintala
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12729?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Serving in the military is an important vehicle through which young Americans invest in their human capital. As such, changes in the desirability of military service may affect the attainment of enlistment requirements, such as a high school degree or equivalent. Using American Community Survey data, we find that exposure to home‐state combat fatalities during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars decreased the probability of high school completion, and increased the probability of general equivalency diploma completion. Using military data, we confirm that exposure to home‐state fatalities selectively deterred some individuals from enlisting. The results suggest military service and educational investments are complements. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; I20, I26, J24)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>WEIGHING THE MILITARY OPTION: THE EFFECTS OF WARTIME CONDITIONS ON INVESTMENTS IN HUMAN CAPITAL</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12729</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-10-03T07:45:51-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12729</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12729?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12728?af=R">
<rss:title>WHEN SHOULD DRIVERS BE ENCOURAGED TO CARPOOL IN HOV LANES?</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Policies to encourage carpooling in high‐occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes have been adopted in the United States to lower congestion and reduce air pollution. We analytically model highway congestion and other vehicle‐related externalities. Encouraging carpooling decreases total costs when congestion relief in mainline lanes outweighs increased HOV lane congestion. Importantly, entry of new drivers via induced demand can negate the benefits of increased carpooling. Using 10 years of traffic data from Los Angeles we estimate time and route‐specific marginal external costs. Because costs vary substantially across routes, hours, and days, current policies to promote carpooling will often increase social costs. (JEL R41, R48, Q53)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Jonathan E. Hughes,
Daniel Kaffine
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12728?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Policies to encourage carpooling in high‐occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes have been adopted in the United States to lower congestion and reduce air pollution. We analytically model highway congestion and other vehicle‐related externalities. Encouraging carpooling decreases total costs when congestion relief in mainline lanes outweighs increased HOV lane congestion. Importantly, entry of new drivers via induced demand can negate the benefits of increased carpooling. Using 10 years of traffic data from Los Angeles we estimate time and route‐specific marginal external costs. Because costs vary substantially across routes, hours, and days, current policies to promote carpooling will often increase social costs. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; R41, R48, Q53)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>WHEN SHOULD DRIVERS BE ENCOURAGED TO CARPOOL IN HOV LANES?</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12728</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-09-28T10:18:42-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12728</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12728?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12726?af=R">
<rss:title>COUPLING COUPLES WITH COPULAS: ANALYSIS OF ASSORTATIVE MATCHING ON RISK ATTITUDE</rss:title>
<dc:description>
We investigate patterns of assortative matching on risk attitude, using self‐reported (ordinal) data on risk attitudes for males and females within married couples, from the German Socio‐Economic Panel over the period 2004–2012. We apply a novel copula‐based bivariate panel ordinal model. Estimation is in two steps: first, a copula‐based Markov model is used to relate the marginal distribution of the response in different time periods, separately for males and females; second, another copula is used to couple the males' and females' conditional (on the past) distributions. We find positive dependence, both in the middle of the distribution, and in the joint tails, and we interpret this as positive assortative matching (PAM). Hence we reject standard assortative matching theories based on risk‐sharing assumptions, and favor models based on alternative assumptions such as the ability of agents to control income risk. We also find evidence of “assimilation”; that is, PAM appearing to increase with years of marriage. (JEL C33, C51, D81)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Aristidis K. Nikoloulopoulos,
Peter G. Moffatt
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12726?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;We investigate patterns of assortative matching on risk attitude, using self‐reported (ordinal) data on risk attitudes for males and females within married couples, from the German Socio‐Economic Panel over the period 2004–2012. We apply a novel copula‐based bivariate panel ordinal model. Estimation is in two steps: first, a copula‐based Markov model is used to relate the marginal distribution of the response in different time periods, separately for males and females; second, another copula is used to couple the males' and females' conditional (on the past) distributions. We find positive dependence, both in the middle of the distribution, and in the joint tails, and we interpret this as positive assortative matching (PAM). Hence we reject standard assortative matching theories based on risk‐sharing assumptions, and favor models based on alternative assumptions such as the ability of agents to control income risk. We also find evidence of “assimilation”; that is, PAM appearing to increase with years of marriage. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C33, C51, D81)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>COUPLING COUPLES WITH COPULAS: ANALYSIS OF ASSORTATIVE MATCHING ON RISK ATTITUDE</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12726</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-09-28T06:29:41-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12726</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12726?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12725?af=R">
<rss:title>WHO WINS IN AN ENERGY BOOM? EVIDENCE FROM WAGE RATES AND HOUSING</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This article presents evidence on the distributional effects of energy extraction by examining the effect of the recent U.S. energy boom on wage rates and housing. The boom increased local wage rates in almost every major occupational category. The increase occurred regardless of whether the occupation experienced a corresponding change in employment, suggesting a tighter labor market that benefited local workers. Wage rates also increased substantially across the entire wage rate distribution, although the percentage increase was slightly higher at the bottom of the distribution than at the top. Local housing values and rental prices both increased, thereby benefiting landowners. For renters, the increase in prices was completely offset by a contemporaneous increase in income. The results suggest that bans on drilling have negative monetary consequences for a large share of local residents. (JEL J23, Q33, R31)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Grant D. Jacobsen
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12725?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This article presents evidence on the distributional effects of energy extraction by examining the effect of the recent U.S. energy boom on wage rates and housing. The boom increased local wage rates in almost every major occupational category. The increase occurred regardless of whether the occupation experienced a corresponding change in employment, suggesting a tighter labor market that benefited local workers. Wage rates also increased substantially across the entire wage rate distribution, although the percentage increase was slightly higher at the bottom of the distribution than at the top. Local housing values and rental prices both increased, thereby benefiting landowners. For renters, the increase in prices was completely offset by a contemporaneous increase in income. The results suggest that bans on drilling have negative monetary consequences for a large share of local residents. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; J23, Q33, R31)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>WHO WINS IN AN ENERGY BOOM? EVIDENCE FROM WAGE RATES AND HOUSING</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12725</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-09-27T12:55:15-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12725</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12725?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12724?af=R">
<rss:title>DOES WHOM YOU KNOW MATTER? UNRAVELING THE INFLUENCE OF PEERS' NETWORK ATTRIBUTES ON ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This paper examines how students' network size, distance, prestige, and connections to influential individuals impact academic performance. Larger and closer networks facilitate information exchange, but may also increase distractions that decrease productivity. We resolve this ambiguity using administrative data from a business school that features random assignment of students to multiple overlapping sets of peers, allowing us to calculate degree, closeness, eigenvector, and Katz‐Bonacich centrality for each node. We find that increasing closeness centrality within the network negatively affects student performance measured by grade point average, suggesting that synergy reduction and information processing costs outweigh benefits from greater information access. (JEL I23, L14, L23)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Tarun Jain,
Nishtha Langer
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12724?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This paper examines how students' network size, distance, prestige, and connections to influential individuals impact academic performance. Larger and closer networks facilitate information exchange, but may also increase distractions that decrease productivity. We resolve this ambiguity using administrative data from a business school that features random assignment of students to multiple overlapping sets of peers, allowing us to calculate degree, closeness, eigenvector, and Katz‐Bonacich centrality for each node. We find that increasing closeness centrality within the network negatively affects student performance measured by grade point average, suggesting that synergy reduction and information processing costs outweigh benefits from greater information access. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; I23, L14, L23)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>DOES WHOM YOU KNOW MATTER? UNRAVELING THE INFLUENCE OF PEERS' NETWORK ATTRIBUTES ON ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12724</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-09-26T03:14:29-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12724</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12724?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12723?af=R">
<rss:title>REAL EXCHANGE RATE, MONETARY POLICY, AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: EVIDENCE FROM A FAVAR MODEL</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This paper examines the effects of exchange rate depreciation to the U.S. economy in a factor‐augmented vector autoregression model using monthly data of 148 variables for the post–Bretton Woods period of 1973–2017. Exchange rate shock is identified to reflect exogenous disturbances to the foreign exchange market, and movements in exchange rate that are not accounted for by changes in the U.S. monetary policy. We find that depreciation is expansionary and inflationary to the broad U.S. economy, the current account improves over time conforming to the J‐curve theory, and monetary policy is leaning against the wind. (JEL E3, E5, F31, F32, F41)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Wei Sun,
Kuhelika De
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12723?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This paper examines the effects of exchange rate depreciation to the U.S. economy in a factor‐augmented vector autoregression model using monthly data of 148 variables for the post–Bretton Woods period of 1973–2017. Exchange rate shock is identified to reflect exogenous disturbances to the foreign exchange market, and movements in exchange rate that are not accounted for by changes in the U.S. monetary policy. We find that depreciation is expansionary and inflationary to the broad U.S. economy, the current account improves over time conforming to the J‐curve theory, and monetary policy is leaning against the wind. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; E3, E5, F31, F32, F41)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>REAL EXCHANGE RATE, MONETARY POLICY, AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: EVIDENCE FROM A FAVAR MODEL</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12723</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-09-26T02:34:08-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12723</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12723?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12721?af=R">
<rss:title>ASSET DYNAMICS, LIQUIDITY, AND INEQUALITY IN DECENTRALIZED MARKETS</rss:title>
<dc:description>
The Kiyotaki and Wright model has exerted a considerable influence on the monetary search literature. We argue that the model also delivers important insights into a broader range of macroeconomic and development issues. The analysis studies how market frictions and the liquidity of assets affect the distribution of income. Experiments illustrate how the economy adjusts to shocks to asset returns and to the matching technology. They also deal with long‐run transition. An experiment interprets the reversal of fortune hypothesis as a situation in which an economy with a low‐return asset takes over a similar economy with a high‐return asset. (JEL C61, C63, E41, E27, D63)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Maurizio Iacopetta,
Raoul Minetti
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12721?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;The Kiyotaki and Wright model has exerted a considerable influence on the monetary search literature. We argue that the model also delivers important insights into a broader range of macroeconomic and development issues. The analysis studies how market frictions and the liquidity of assets affect the distribution of income. Experiments illustrate how the economy adjusts to shocks to asset returns and to the matching technology. They also deal with long‐run transition. An experiment interprets the reversal of fortune hypothesis as a situation in which an economy with a low‐return asset takes over a similar economy with a high‐return asset. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C61, C63, E41, E27, D63)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>ASSET DYNAMICS, LIQUIDITY, AND INEQUALITY IN DECENTRALIZED MARKETS</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12721</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-09-21T08:56:06-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12721</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12721?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12719?af=R">
<rss:title>THE TURKISH CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT</rss:title>
<dc:description>
During the 2011–2015 period, Turkey's current account deficit as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) was one of the largest among the Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development countries. In this paper, we examine if this deficit can be considered optimal using the Engel and Rogers's approach. In this framework, the current account of a country is determined by the expected discounted present value of its future share of world GDP relative to its current share. A country whose income is anticipated to rise relative to the rest of the world is expected to borrow now and run a current account deficit. Our findings suggest that Turkey's current account deficit in 2015 may be considered optimal if the Turkish economy's share in the world economy could continue to grow at rates similar to the past or to the predictions from professional forecasts. The same approach, however, indicates that the current account deficit in 2011, at its peak, was unlikely to be optimal. (JEL F32, F41, F43)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Osman F. Abbasoğlu,
Ayşe İmrohoroğlu,
Ayşe Kabukçuoğlu
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12719?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;During the 2011–2015 period, Turkey's current account deficit as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) was one of the largest among the Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development countries. In this paper, we examine if this deficit can be considered optimal using the Engel and Rogers's approach. In this framework, the current account of a country is determined by the expected discounted present value of its future share of world GDP relative to its current share. A country whose income is anticipated to rise relative to the rest of the world is expected to borrow now and run a current account deficit. Our findings suggest that Turkey's current account deficit in 2015 may be considered optimal if the Turkish economy's share in the world economy could continue to grow at rates similar to the past or to the predictions from professional forecasts. The same approach, however, indicates that the current account deficit in 2011, at its peak, was unlikely to be optimal. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; F32, F41, F43)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>THE TURKISH CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12719</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-09-21T08:56:01-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12719</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12719?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12722?af=R">
<rss:title>WHO QUITS NEXT? FIRM GROWTH IN GROWING ECONOMIES</rss:title>
<dc:description>
We document novel facts about the relationship between aggregate growth and firm dynamics using a large set of countries. We argue that firm employment patterns are not necessarily informative about cross‐country differences in aggregate growth because they are induced by changes in the productivity of a firm relative to others. In contrast, aggregate growth is linked to average firm‐level productivity growth and firm age. We formalize this intuition through a tractable model of endogenous aggregate growth and firm dynamics where firms realize positive returns to investment with some probability. We find that cross‐country disparities in this probability can account for two‐thirds of the variation in aggregate growth. (JEL D21, D22, E23, O4)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Julieta Caunedo,
Emircan Yurdagul
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12722?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;We document novel facts about the relationship between aggregate growth and firm dynamics using a large set of countries. We argue that firm employment patterns are not necessarily informative about cross‐country differences in aggregate growth because they are induced by changes in the productivity of a firm relative to others. In contrast, aggregate growth is linked to average firm‐level productivity growth and firm age. We formalize this intuition through a tractable model of endogenous aggregate growth and firm dynamics where firms realize positive returns to investment with some probability. We find that cross‐country disparities in this probability can account for two‐thirds of the variation in aggregate growth. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; D21, D22, E23, O4)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>WHO QUITS NEXT? FIRM GROWTH IN GROWING ECONOMIES</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12722</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-09-21T08:55:42-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12722</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12722?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12718?af=R">
<rss:title>GENDER DIFFERENCES IN MOTIVATIONAL CROWDING OUT OF WORK PERFORMANCE</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This paper shows that prior financial incentives induce a crowding‐out effect when incentives are discontinued. In our real‐effort experiment workers receive a piece rate before monetary incentives are substituted by a one‐time payment. In this case, workers' performance significantly drops when receiving the one‐time payment. The effect is driven by a fraction of men who reduce effort substantially, whereas women constantly perform well. We find that this motivational crowding‐out effect disappears when men do not have prior experience of a piece rate. In a series of control treatments, we discard several alternative explanations besides motivational crowding out. (JEL C91, J16, M54)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Volker Benndorf,
Holger A. Rau,
Christian Sölch
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12718?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This paper shows that prior financial incentives induce a crowding‐out effect when incentives are discontinued. In our real‐effort experiment workers receive a piece rate before monetary incentives are substituted by a one‐time payment. In this case, workers' performance significantly drops when receiving the one‐time payment. The effect is driven by a fraction of men who reduce effort substantially, whereas women constantly perform well. We find that this motivational crowding‐out effect disappears when men do not have prior experience of a piece rate. In a series of control treatments, we discard several alternative explanations besides motivational crowding out. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C91, J16, M54)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>GENDER DIFFERENCES IN MOTIVATIONAL CROWDING OUT OF WORK PERFORMANCE</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12718</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-09-19T05:55:49-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12718</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12718?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12720?af=R">
<rss:title>EXCLUSION AND REINTEGRATION IN A SOCIAL DILEMMA</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Using a social dilemma game, we study the cooperative behavior of individuals who reintegrate their group after being excluded by their peers. We manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed exogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators and they punish more, and more severely, chronic defections. In return, a longer exclusion has a higher disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration, but only when the length of exclusion is not chosen by group members. Its relative disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration is smaller when the length of exclusion results from a vote. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. The difference in the impact of long versus short exclusion on retaliation is larger when the length of exclusion is chosen by group members than when it is exogenous. Post‐reintegration cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish. (JEL C92, H41, D23)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Alice Solda,
Marie Claire Villeval
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12720?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Using a social dilemma game, we study the cooperative behavior of individuals who reintegrate their group after being excluded by their peers. We manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed exogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators and they punish more, and more severely, chronic defections. In return, a longer exclusion has a higher disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration, but only when the length of exclusion is not chosen by group members. Its relative disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration is smaller when the length of exclusion results from a vote. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. The difference in the impact of long versus short exclusion on retaliation is larger when the length of exclusion is chosen by group members than when it is exogenous. Post‐reintegration cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C92, H41, D23)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>EXCLUSION AND REINTEGRATION IN A SOCIAL DILEMMA</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12720</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-09-17T11:58:16-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12720</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12720?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12717?af=R">
<rss:title>INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND LABOR‐MARKET DISCRIMINATION</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Discrimination reduces the matching probability and output in the skill‐intensive differentiated‐product sector so that discrimination‐induced comparative advantage may overshadow technological comparative advantage in determining the pattern of trade. Trade liberalization generates a decrease in the skilled‐worker wage gap in the country that is an exporter of goods from the simple sector but increases it in the country that is a net exporter of differentiated products. Trade liberalization has an opposite effect on firms. In the country that is an exporter of simple goods, trade liberalization reduces the profits of the nondiscriminatory firms by more than those of the discriminatory firms. (JEL F16, F66, J71)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Richard Chisik,
Julian Emami Namini
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12717?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Discrimination reduces the matching probability and output in the skill‐intensive differentiated‐product sector so that discrimination‐induced comparative advantage may overshadow technological comparative advantage in determining the pattern of trade. Trade liberalization generates a decrease in the skilled‐worker wage gap in the country that is an exporter of goods from the simple sector but increases it in the country that is a net exporter of differentiated products. Trade liberalization has an opposite effect on firms. In the country that is an exporter of simple goods, trade liberalization reduces the profits of the nondiscriminatory firms by more than those of the discriminatory firms. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; F16, F66, J71)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND LABOR‐MARKET DISCRIMINATION</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12717</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-09-17T01:41:41-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12717</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12717?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12712?af=R">
<rss:title>BIDDING FOR TALENT IN SPORT</rss:title>
<dc:description>
We present a novel microstructure for the market for athletes. Clubs simultaneously target bids at the players, in (Nash) equilibrium internalizing whether—depending on the other clubs' bids—a player not hired would play for the competition. When talent is either scarce or has low outside options, we support—and generalize to heterogeneous players—the Coasian results of Rottenberg (1956) and Fort and Quirk (1995): talent allocation is efficient and independent of initial “ownership” and revenue sharing arrangements. We also characterize equilibria when talent is abundant (or has a high outside option). The analysis uses a nonspecific club objective with an endogenously derived trade‐off between pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits.(JEL J4, L1, L2)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Roberto Burguet,
József Sákovics
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12712?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;We present a novel microstructure for the market for athletes. Clubs simultaneously target bids at the players, in (Nash) equilibrium internalizing whether—depending on the other clubs' bids—a player not hired would play for the competition. When talent is either scarce or has low outside options, we support—and generalize to heterogeneous players—the Coasian results of Rottenberg (1956) and Fort and Quirk (1995): talent allocation is efficient and independent of initial “ownership” and revenue sharing arrangements. We also characterize equilibria when talent is abundant (or has a high outside option). The analysis uses a nonspecific club objective with an endogenously derived trade‐off between pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits.(&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; J4, L1, L2)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>BIDDING FOR TALENT IN SPORT</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12712</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-09-17T01:41:33-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12712</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12712?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12714?af=R">
<rss:title>A NEW MONETARIST MODEL OF FIAT AND E‐MONEY</rss:title>
<dc:description>
We develop a dual payment New Monetarist model, where an electronic money (e‐purse) competes with fiat money (cash). The two payment instruments differ in terms of security, cost, and acceptability. Strategic complementarities lead to multiple monetary equilibria. We establish the conditions under which e‐money can coexist with, or replace fiat money, and explain the reasons for the e‐purse failure/success in a few countries. We also compare welfare when one currency or both circulate. When the risk of theft of cash is endogenous, e‐money cannot replace cash entirely; however, low inflation can facilitate the adoption of e‐money in parallel with fiat money. (JEL D83, E40, E50)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Sébastien Lotz,
Françoise Vasselin
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12714?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;We develop a dual payment New Monetarist model, where an electronic money (e‐purse) competes with fiat money (cash). The two payment instruments differ in terms of security, cost, and acceptability. Strategic complementarities lead to multiple monetary equilibria. We establish the conditions under which e‐money can coexist with, or replace fiat money, and explain the reasons for the e‐purse failure/success in a few countries. We also compare welfare when one currency or both circulate. When the risk of theft of cash is endogenous, e‐money cannot replace cash entirely; however, low inflation can facilitate the adoption of e‐money in parallel with fiat money. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; D83, E40, E50)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>A NEW MONETARIST MODEL OF FIAT AND E‐MONEY</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12714</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-09-17T01:39:51-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12714</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12714?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12716?af=R">
<rss:title>RISK AVERSION AND OVERBIDDING IN FIRST PRICE SEALED BID AUCTIONS: NEW EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Bidding above the risk‐neutral Nash equilibrium in first price sealed bid auctions has traditionally been ascribed to risk aversion. Later studies, however, offer other explanations and even argue that risk aversion plays no or a minor role. In a novel experimental design, we directly test the relationship between risk aversion and overbidding by systematically varying the distribution of risk attitudes in auction markets. We find a significant relationship between our measure of risk aversion and overbidding. (JEL D44, C91)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Sascha Füllbrunn,
Dirk‐Jan Janssen,
Utz Weitzel
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12716?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Bidding above the risk‐neutral Nash equilibrium in first price sealed bid auctions has traditionally been ascribed to risk aversion. Later studies, however, offer other explanations and even argue that risk aversion plays no or a minor role. In a novel experimental design, we directly test the relationship between risk aversion and overbidding by systematically varying the distribution of risk attitudes in auction markets. We find a significant relationship between our measure of risk aversion and overbidding. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; D44, C91)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>RISK AVERSION AND OVERBIDDING IN FIRST PRICE SEALED BID AUCTIONS: NEW EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12716</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-09-17T01:39:33-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12716</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12716?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12710?af=R">
<rss:title>DETERMINANTS OF REVENUE IN SPORTS LEAGUES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This study investigates determinants of revenue in North America's four major professional sports leagues. Revenue is positively associated with on‐field success in baseball (MLB), basketball (NBA), and hockey (NHL), but not in football (NFL). The returns to success are not diminishing as commonly assumed, which casts doubt on the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, and differences across leagues are consistent with revenue sharing arrangements. Estimates indicate a strong negative but diminishing relationship between stadium age and revenue. Teams in larger markets generate more revenue than smaller markets, but the returns to success do not differ according to market size. (JEL Z21)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
John Charles Bradbury
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12710?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This study investigates determinants of revenue in North America's four major professional sports leagues. Revenue is positively associated with on‐field success in baseball (MLB), basketball (NBA), and hockey (NHL), but not in football (NFL). The returns to success are not diminishing as commonly assumed, which casts doubt on the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, and differences across leagues are consistent with revenue sharing arrangements. Estimates indicate a strong negative but diminishing relationship between stadium age and revenue. Teams in larger markets generate more revenue than smaller markets, but the returns to success do not differ according to market size. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; Z21)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>DETERMINANTS OF REVENUE IN SPORTS LEAGUES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12710</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-09-11T11:03:18-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12710</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12710?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12713?af=R">
<rss:title>LINKING WEALTH AND PUNISHMENT EFFECTIVENESS: PUNISHMENT AND COOPERATION UNDER CONGRUENT HETEROGENEITIES</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Global and local cooperation in supplying global public goods is often insufficient. In this respect, laboratory experiments show that peer punishment is an effective cooperation‐enhancing instrument. However, it is unclear whether peer punishment would facilitate cooperation and public good provision even under congruent heterogeneities in wealth and punishment effectiveness. To this end, we experimentally study the effect of peer punishment under joint heterogeneities, where either the richest or the poorest member is also the most effective punisher. We compare these joint heterogeneities to treatments with single heterogeneities in either endowment or punishment effectiveness and to a baseline symmetry treatment with homogeneous parties. We find that heterogeneity in punishment effectiveness does not matter for cooperation, whereas endowment heterogeneity reduces cooperation compared to symmetry. This is because rich members contribute a lower portion of their endowment to the public good than their poorer counterparts. We also observe that cooperation is higher under joint heterogeneities in endowment and punishment effectiveness than under endowment heterogeneity (with no differences than under symmetry). This holds even when the rich party gains less from cooperation and is the most effective punisher. (JEL C92, D74, H41)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Israel Waichman
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12713?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Global and local cooperation in supplying global public goods is often insufficient. In this respect, laboratory experiments show that peer punishment is an effective cooperation‐enhancing instrument. However, it is unclear whether peer punishment would facilitate cooperation and public good provision even under congruent heterogeneities in wealth and punishment effectiveness. To this end, we experimentally study the effect of peer punishment under joint heterogeneities, where either the richest or the poorest member is also the most effective punisher. We compare these joint heterogeneities to treatments with single heterogeneities in either endowment or punishment effectiveness and to a baseline symmetry treatment with homogeneous parties. We find that heterogeneity in punishment effectiveness does not matter for cooperation, whereas endowment heterogeneity reduces cooperation compared to symmetry. This is because rich members contribute a lower portion of their endowment to the public good than their poorer counterparts. We also observe that cooperation is higher under joint heterogeneities in endowment and punishment effectiveness than under endowment heterogeneity (with no differences than under symmetry). This holds even when the rich party gains less from cooperation and is the most effective punisher. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C92, D74, H41)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>LINKING WEALTH AND PUNISHMENT EFFECTIVENESS: PUNISHMENT AND COOPERATION UNDER CONGRUENT HETEROGENEITIES</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12713</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-09-10T09:43:39-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12713</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12713?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12715?af=R">
<rss:title>RESERVE PRICE VERSUS ENTRY FEE IN STANDARD AUCTIONS</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Analysis of standard auction rules when bidders are risk averse is usually carried out under the assumption that the seller is able to set an optimal reserve. The role of entry fees has been generally overlooked in that analysis. We consider bidders with constant absolute risk aversion and show that reserve price is an essential tool in the second price auction while entry fee is essential in the first price auction. Furthermore, setting a reserve price and entry fee combination optimally may change some of the rankings of the standard auctions that hold under optimal reserves. (JEL D44)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Indranil Chakraborty
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12715?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Analysis of standard auction rules when bidders are risk averse is usually carried out under the assumption that the seller is able to set an optimal reserve. The role of entry fees has been generally overlooked in that analysis. We consider bidders with constant absolute risk aversion and show that reserve price is an essential tool in the second price auction while entry fee is essential in the first price auction. Furthermore, setting a reserve price and entry fee combination optimally may change some of the rankings of the standard auctions that hold under optimal reserves. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; D44)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>RESERVE PRICE VERSUS ENTRY FEE IN STANDARD AUCTIONS</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12715</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-09-06T12:09:04-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12715</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12715?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12708?af=R">
<rss:title>ROLE‐REVERSAL CONSISTENCY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE GOLDEN RULE</rss:title>
<dc:description>
We report an experiment that asks whether people in a strategic situation behave according to the Golden Rule, that is, do not treat others in ways that they find disagreeable to themselves, a property that we call role‐reversal consistency. Overall, we find that over three quarters of the subjects are role‐reversal consistent. Regression analysis suggests that this finding is not driven by players maximizing their subjective expected monetary earnings given their stated beliefs about their opponents' behavior. We find that subjects' stated beliefs and actions reveal mild projection bias. (JEL C78, C91)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Miguel A. Costa‐Gomes,
Yuan Ju,
Jiawen Li
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12708?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;We report an experiment that asks whether people in a strategic situation behave according to the Golden Rule, that is, do not treat others in ways that they find disagreeable to themselves, a property that we call role‐reversal consistency. Overall, we find that over three quarters of the subjects are role‐reversal consistent. Regression analysis suggests that this finding is not driven by players maximizing their subjective expected monetary earnings given their stated beliefs about their opponents' behavior. We find that subjects' stated beliefs and actions reveal mild projection bias. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C78, C91)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>ROLE‐REVERSAL CONSISTENCY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE GOLDEN RULE</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12708</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-31T12:15:00-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12708</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12708?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12709?af=R">
<rss:title>A MODEL OF ADDICTION AND SOCIAL INTERACTIONS</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Many consumer behaviors are both addictive and social. Understanding how these two phenomena interact informs basic models of human  behavior, and  matters for policymakers when the behavior is regulated. I develop a new model of demand that incorporates both addiction and social interactions and show that, under certain conditions, social interactions reinforce the effects of addiction. I also show how the dynamics introduced by addiction can solve the pernicious problem of identifying the causal effects of social interactions. I then use the model to illustrate a new and important identification problem for studies of social interactions: existing estimates cannot be used to draw welfare conclusions or even to deduce whether social interactions increase aggregate demand. Finally, I develop a method that allows researchers to distinguish between two common forms of social interactions and draw welfare conclusions. (JEL D11, H20)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Julian Reif
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12709?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Many consumer behaviors are both addictive and social. Understanding how these two phenomena interact informs basic models of human  behavior, and  matters for policymakers when the behavior is regulated. I develop a new model of demand that incorporates both addiction and social interactions and show that, under certain conditions, social interactions reinforce the effects of addiction. I also show how the dynamics introduced by addiction can solve the pernicious problem of identifying the causal effects of social interactions. I then use the model to illustrate a new and important identification problem for studies of social interactions: existing estimates cannot be used to draw welfare conclusions or even to deduce whether social interactions increase aggregate demand. Finally, I develop a method that allows researchers to distinguish between two common forms of social interactions and draw welfare conclusions. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; D11, H20)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>A MODEL OF ADDICTION AND SOCIAL INTERACTIONS</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12709</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-30T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12709</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12709?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12577?af=R">
<rss:title>EIGENSTALLER'S MARKET</rss:title>
<dc:description/>
<dc:creator>
Matthew G. Nagler
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12577?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded/>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 2234-2241, October 2018. </rss:description>
<dc:title>EIGENSTALLER'S MARKET</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12577</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-29T03:09:22-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:volume>56</prism:volume>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:coverDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12577</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12577?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12688?af=R">
<rss:title>DO BETTER INFORMED INVESTORS ALWAYS DO BETTER? A BUYBACK PUZZLE</rss:title>
<dc:description>
We explore the value of private investment information using data from a singular source: auctions of yearling racehorses. Horse breeders possess superior information about their own horses and have strong financial incentives to buy the best of these back at auction. However, those they repurchase subsequently perform significantly worse on average, earning 30% less at the racetrack than horses purchased by outsiders. Moreover, this underperformance is concentrated in male horses, despite these being purchased exclusively for racing purposes. These puzzling findings cannot be explained by differences in horse risk or breeder abilities, or by nonfinancial objectives, or by behavioral or selection biases. (JEL G02, G11, G14, L83, D44)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Glenn Boyle,
Gerald Ward
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12688?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;We explore the value of private investment information using data from a singular source: auctions of yearling racehorses. Horse breeders possess superior information about their own horses and have strong financial incentives to buy the best of these back at auction. However, those they repurchase subsequently perform significantly &lt;i&gt;worse&lt;/i&gt; on average, earning 30% less at the racetrack than horses purchased by outsiders. Moreover, this underperformance is concentrated in male horses, despite these being purchased exclusively for racing purposes. These puzzling findings cannot be explained by differences in horse risk or breeder abilities, or by nonfinancial objectives, or by behavioral or selection biases. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; G02, G11, G14, L83, D44)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 2137-2157, October 2018. </rss:description>
<dc:title>DO BETTER INFORMED INVESTORS ALWAYS DO BETTER? A BUYBACK PUZZLE</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12688</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-29T03:09:22-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:volume>56</prism:volume>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:coverDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12688</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12688?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12689?af=R">
<rss:title>WHY ARE U.S. WOMEN DECREASING THEIR LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION IF THEIR WAGES ARE RISING?</rss:title>
<dc:description>Given the traditional interpretation of women's labor force participation rate (LFPR) trends as movements along a positively sloped labor supply curve, it is surprising that the recent downward trend in U.S. women's LFPR has occurred over a period when women's real wages were commonly believed to be rising. I find that almost two‐thirds of the decline since 2000 is attributable to aging of the adult female population. The remainder, due to declining labor force participation for women under 55, becomes less puzzling in light of my evidence that the wage/education locus faced by women actually may have worsened since 2000. (JEL J21, J31, J82)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Chen Huang
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12689?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Given the traditional interpretation of women's labor force participation rate (LFPR) trends as movements along a positively sloped labor supply curve, it is surprising that the recent downward trend in U.S. women's LFPR has occurred over a period when women's real wages were commonly believed to be rising. I find that almost two‐thirds of the decline since 2000 is attributable to aging of the adult female population. The remainder, due to declining labor force participation for women under 55, becomes less puzzling in light of my evidence that the wage/education locus faced by women actually may have worsened since 2000. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; J21, J31, J82)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 2010-2026, October 2018. </rss:description>
<dc:title>WHY ARE U.S. WOMEN DECREASING THEIR LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION IF THEIR WAGES ARE RISING?</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12689</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-29T03:09:22-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:volume>56</prism:volume>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:coverDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12689</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12689?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12580?af=R">
<rss:title>LABOR'S SHARE, THE FIRM'S MARKET POWER, AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY</rss:title>
<dc:description>
We investigate the relationship between labor's share, firm's market power, and the elasticity of output with respect to labor input using an approach based on an unobserved components model. The approach yields time‐varying estimates of market power and the elasticity. Evidence on the market power of firms (which we find to be rising since 2000) gives a deeper understanding of movements in labor's share and the labor wedge. The generated values of the elasticity yield revised estimates of total factor productivity growth which is informative about the extent of the downward bias inherent in traditional estimates which use labor's share as a proxy for the elasticity. (JEL O47, C32, E25)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Robert Dixon,
Guay C. Lim
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12580?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;We investigate the relationship between labor's share, firm's market power, and the elasticity of output with respect to labor input using an approach based on an unobserved components model. The approach yields time‐varying estimates of market power and the elasticity. Evidence on the market power of firms (which we find to be rising since 2000) gives a deeper understanding of movements in labor's share and the labor wedge. The generated values of the elasticity yield revised estimates of total factor productivity growth which is informative about the extent of the downward bias inherent in traditional estimates which use labor's share as a proxy for the elasticity. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; O47, C32, E25)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 2058-2076, October 2018. </rss:description>
<dc:title>LABOR'S SHARE, THE FIRM'S MARKET POWER, AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12580</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-29T03:09:22-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:volume>56</prism:volume>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:coverDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12580</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12580?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12582?af=R">
<rss:title>INEQUALITY OF SUBJECTIVE WELL‐BEING AS A COMPREHENSIVE MEASURE OF INEQUALITY</rss:title>
<dc:description>
The link between happiness and overall inequality is best studied using an index that incorporates different aspects of inequality, and is measured consistently in different countries. One such index is the degree to which happiness itself varies among individuals. Its correlation with both happiness levels and social trust is substantially stronger than the corresponding correlation for income inequality. This remains so after allowing for bounded scale reporting, including a purely ordinal measure of dispersion. Moreover, the correlation is stronger for individuals who profess to care most about inequality. The link between happiness and inequality may thus be stronger than previously appreciated. (JEL I31, D6, D63, D31)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Leonard Goff,
John F. Helliwell,
Guy Mayraz
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12582?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;The link between happiness and overall inequality is best studied using an index that incorporates different aspects of inequality, and is measured consistently in different countries. One such index is the degree to which happiness itself varies among individuals. Its correlation with both happiness levels and social trust is substantially stronger than the corresponding correlation for income inequality. This remains so after allowing for bounded scale reporting, including a purely ordinal measure of dispersion. Moreover, the correlation is stronger for individuals who profess to care most about inequality. The link between happiness and inequality may thus be stronger than previously appreciated. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; I31, D6, D63, D31)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 2177-2194, October 2018. </rss:description>
<dc:title>INEQUALITY OF SUBJECTIVE WELL‐BEING AS A COMPREHENSIVE MEASURE OF INEQUALITY</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12582</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-29T03:09:22-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:volume>56</prism:volume>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:coverDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12582</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12582?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12584?af=R">
<rss:title>PARLIAMENT SHAPES AND SIZES</rss:title>
<dc:description>This paper proposes a model of Parliamentary institutions in which a society makes three decisions behind the veil of ignorance: whether a Parliament should comprise one or two chambers, what the relative bargaining power of each chamber should be if the Parliament is bicameral, and how many legislators should sit in each chamber. We document empirical regularities across countries that are consistent with the predictions of our model. (JEL D71, D72)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Raphael Godefroy,
Nicolas Klein
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12584?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;This paper proposes a model of Parliamentary institutions in which a society makes three decisions behind the veil of ignorance: whether a Parliament should comprise one or two chambers, what the relative bargaining power of each chamber should be if the Parliament is bicameral, and how many legislators should sit in each chamber. We document empirical regularities across countries that are consistent with the predictions of our model. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; D71, D72)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 2212-2233, October 2018. </rss:description>
<dc:title>PARLIAMENT SHAPES AND SIZES</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12584</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-29T03:09:22-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:volume>56</prism:volume>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:coverDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12584</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12584?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12587?af=R">
<rss:title>MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS, EXPECTATIONS, AND INFORMATION RIGIDITIES</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This paper contributes to the literature by assessing expectation effects from monetary policy for G7 economies. We rely on expectation data from Consensus Economics and a panel vector autoregression framework, which accounts for international spillovers and time‐variation. We analyze whether monetary policy has changed the degree of information rigidity after the emergence of the subprime crisis and estimate effects of interest rate changes on expectations, disagreements, and forecast errors. We find strong evidence for information rigidities and identify higher forecast errors by professionals after monetary policy shocks. Our results suggest that the international transmission of monetary policy shocks introduces noisy information and partly increases disagreement among forecasters. (JEL E31, E52)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Joscha Beckmann,
Robert L. Czudaj
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12587?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This paper contributes to the literature by assessing expectation effects from monetary policy for G7 economies. We rely on expectation data from Consensus Economics and a panel vector autoregression framework, which accounts for international spillovers and time‐variation. We analyze whether monetary policy has changed the degree of information rigidity after the emergence of the subprime crisis and estimate effects of interest rate changes on expectations, disagreements, and forecast errors. We find strong evidence for information rigidities and identify higher forecast errors by professionals after monetary policy shocks. Our results suggest that the international transmission of monetary policy shocks introduces noisy information and partly increases disagreement among forecasters. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; E31, E52)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 2158-2176, October 2018. </rss:description>
<dc:title>MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS, EXPECTATIONS, AND INFORMATION RIGIDITIES</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12587</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-29T03:09:22-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:volume>56</prism:volume>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:coverDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12587</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12587?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12574?af=R">
<rss:title>QUANTIFYING THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF ANTICARTEL ENFORCEMENT</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This paper presents a rare attempt to quantify the deterrent effect of anticartel policy. It develops a conceptual framework, which establishes the sort of information necessary for such quantification. This is then illustrated and calibrated by drawing upon existing literatures and using evidence from legal cartels to approximate what would be observed absent policy. Measuring impact by the proportion of all potential harm that is deterred, our best estimate is two‐thirds and, even on conservative assumptions, at least half of all harms (or seven times the detected harm) is deterred. (JEL H11, K21, L44)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Stephen Davies,
Franco Mariuzzo,
Peter L. Ormosi
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12574?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This paper presents a rare attempt to quantify the deterrent effect of anticartel policy. It develops a conceptual framework, which establishes the sort of information necessary for such quantification. This is then illustrated and calibrated by drawing upon existing literatures and using evidence from legal cartels to approximate what would be observed absent policy. Measuring impact by the proportion of all potential harm that is deterred, our best estimate is two‐thirds and, even on conservative assumptions, at least half of all harms (or seven times the detected harm) is deterred. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; H11, K21, L44)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 1933-1949, October 2018. </rss:description>
<dc:title>QUANTIFYING THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF ANTICARTEL ENFORCEMENT</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12574</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-29T03:09:22-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:volume>56</prism:volume>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:coverDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12574</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12574?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12565?af=R">
<rss:title>THE OPTIMAL DEFENSE OF NETWORKS OF TARGETS</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This paper examines a game‐theoretic model of attack and defense of multiple networks of targets in which there exist intranetwork strategic complementarities among targets. The defender's objective is to successfully defend all the networks and the attacker's objective is to successfully attack at least one network of targets. Although there are multiple equilibria, we characterize correlation structures in the allocations of forces across targets that arise in all equilibria. For example, in all equilibria the attacker utilizes a stochastic “guerrilla warfare” strategy in which a single random network is attacked. (JEL C72, D74)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Dan Kovenock,
Brian Roberson
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12565?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This paper examines a game‐theoretic model of attack and defense of multiple networks of targets in which there exist intranetwork strategic complementarities among targets. The defender's objective is to successfully defend all the networks and the attacker's objective is to successfully attack at least one network of targets. Although there are multiple equilibria, we characterize correlation structures in the allocations of forces across targets that arise in all equilibria. For example, in all equilibria the attacker utilizes a stochastic “guerrilla warfare” strategy in which a single random network is attacked. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C72, D74)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 2195-2211, October 2018. </rss:description>
<dc:title>THE OPTIMAL DEFENSE OF NETWORKS OF TARGETS</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12565</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-29T03:09:22-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:volume>56</prism:volume>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:coverDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12565</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12565?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12692?af=R">
<rss:title>LOBBYING FOR MINIMUM WAGES</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Using a common agency lobbying framework, this paper illustrates how the minimum wage set reflects the interaction between economic and political factors and under what circumstances will the policymaker be induced, through lobbying, to change the minimum wage. Specifically, when the labor demand elasticity is large, lobbying is successful in inducing the policymaker to set the minimum wage in accordance with her political ideology. However, the paper also shows the conditions under which lobbying will reverse the ideological preference and induce a business‐friendly government to increase the minimum wage. Empirical analysis on a panel data for ten Canadian provinces gives considerable support for theoretical predictions. The real minimum wage decreases in skill‐adjusted union density and political ideology, while larger labor demand elasticity reinforces the influence of political ideology in the presence of lobbying. (JEL J38, D72, D78)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Josip Lesica
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12692?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Using a common agency lobbying framework, this paper illustrates how the minimum wage set reflects the interaction between economic and political factors and under what circumstances will the policymaker be induced, through lobbying, to change the minimum wage. Specifically, when the labor demand elasticity is large, lobbying is successful in inducing the policymaker to set the minimum wage in accordance with her political ideology. However, the paper also shows the conditions under which lobbying will reverse the ideological preference and induce a business‐friendly government to increase the minimum wage. Empirical analysis on a panel data for ten Canadian provinces gives considerable support for theoretical predictions. The real minimum wage decreases in skill‐adjusted union density and political ideology, while larger labor demand elasticity reinforces the influence of political ideology in the presence of lobbying. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; J38, D72, D78)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 2027-2057, October 2018. </rss:description>
<dc:title>LOBBYING FOR MINIMUM WAGES</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12692</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-29T03:09:22-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:volume>56</prism:volume>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:coverDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12692</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12692?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12573?af=R">
<rss:title>EMISSION TAXES, CLEAN TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION, AND PRODUCT MARKET COLLUSION: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE</rss:title>
<dc:description>
We use a laboratory experiment to study the link between cooperative research and development (R&amp;amp;D) in clean technology and collusion in a downstream product market in the presence of a time‐consistent emissions tax. Such a tax creates additional interconnections between firms, in addition to the standard technological spillovers. Our results show a strong link between R&amp;amp;D cooperation and market collusion under symmetric R&amp;amp;D spillovers in a duopoly, but when the spillovers are asymmetric, R&amp;amp;D cooperation does not necessarily result in collusion. With symmetric spillovers, the link between R&amp;amp;D cooperation and collusion remains strong even in three‐ and four‐firm industries. (JEL C90, L5, O30, Q55)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Soo Keong Yong,
Lana Friesen,
Stuart McDonald
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12573?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;We use a laboratory experiment to study the link between cooperative research and development (R&amp;D) in clean technology and collusion in a downstream product market in the presence of a time‐consistent emissions tax. Such a tax creates additional interconnections between firms, in addition to the standard technological spillovers. Our results show a strong link between R&amp;D cooperation and market collusion under symmetric R&amp;D spillovers in a duopoly, but when the spillovers are asymmetric, R&amp;D cooperation does not necessarily result in collusion. With symmetric spillovers, the link between R&amp;D cooperation and collusion remains strong even in three‐ and four‐firm industries. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C90, L5, O30, Q55)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 1950-1979, October 2018. </rss:description>
<dc:title>EMISSION TAXES, CLEAN TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION, AND PRODUCT MARKET COLLUSION: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12573</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-29T03:09:22-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:volume>56</prism:volume>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:coverDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12573</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12573?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12576?af=R">
<rss:title>DO BUSINESSMEN MAKE GOOD GOVERNORS?</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This paper evaluates the economic performance of U.S. state governors with a business background (chief executive officer [CEO] governors). Applying a matching method, I find, first, that businesspeople tend to take office in times of economic and fiscal strain. Second, the tenures of CEO governors are associated with a 0.5 percentage points (pp.) higher annual income growth rate, a 0.4 pp. higher growth rate of the private capital stock, and a 0.6 pp. lower unemployment rate than are the tenures of non‐CEO governors. State‐level income inequality is not affected by CEO governors holding office, indicating that low‐income households benefit from the economic upswing. (JEL C21, E24, O47)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Florian Neumeier
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12576?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This paper evaluates the economic performance of U.S. state governors with a business background (chief executive officer [CEO] governors). Applying a matching method, I find, first, that businesspeople tend to take office in times of economic and fiscal strain. Second, the tenures of CEO governors are associated with a 0.5 percentage points (pp.) higher annual income growth rate, a 0.4 pp. higher growth rate of the private capital stock, and a 0.6 pp. lower unemployment rate than are the tenures of non‐CEO governors. State‐level income inequality is not affected by CEO governors holding office, indicating that low‐income households benefit from the economic upswing. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C21, E24, O47)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 2116-2136, October 2018. </rss:description>
<dc:title>DO BUSINESSMEN MAKE GOOD GOVERNORS?</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12576</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-29T03:09:22-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:volume>56</prism:volume>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:coverDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12576</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12576?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12578?af=R">
<rss:title>THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND COLLEGE ENROLLMENT DECISIONS</rss:title>
<dc:description>
We investigate the effect of the expansion of the federal dependent coverage mandate for young adults under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on college enrollment decisions of young Americans. The expansion removes the requirement that young individuals need to be enrolled as full‐time students in order to remain on their parents' health insurance past the age of 18 and expands the coverage mandate to age 26 irrespective of student status. This changes the incentives for the full‐time college enrollment decisions of young individuals. We use panel data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for the years 2003–2013 and estimate that the dependent coverage expansion under the ACA decreases the probability to enroll as full‐time student by 3 percentage points using a difference‐in‐differences framework. Furthermore, we find that part‐time college enrollment is unaffected by the new policy. The results are robust to changes in the model specification and become stronger when we increase the sample overlap between treatment and control groups using trimming based on propensity scores. (JEL C35, I23, I10, I18)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Juergen Jung,
Vinish Shrestha
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12578?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;We investigate the effect of the expansion of the federal dependent coverage mandate for young adults under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on college enrollment decisions of young Americans. The expansion removes the requirement that young individuals need to be enrolled as full‐time students in order to remain on their parents' health insurance past the age of 18 and expands the coverage mandate to age 26 irrespective of student status. This changes the incentives for the full‐time college enrollment decisions of young individuals. We use panel data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for the years 2003–2013 and estimate that the dependent coverage expansion under the ACA decreases the probability to enroll as full‐time student by 3 percentage points using a difference‐in‐differences framework. Furthermore, we find that part‐time college enrollment is unaffected by the new policy. The results are robust to changes in the model specification and become stronger when we increase the sample overlap between treatment and control groups using trimming based on propensity scores. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C35, I23, I10, I18)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 1980-2009, October 2018. </rss:description>
<dc:title>THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND COLLEGE ENROLLMENT DECISIONS</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12578</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-29T03:09:22-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:volume>56</prism:volume>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:coverDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12578</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12578?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12579?af=R">
<rss:title>THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ARBITRAGE IN U.S. BANKS' INTERNATIONAL FLOWS: BANK‐LEVEL EVIDENCE</rss:title>
<dc:description>
I study the prevalence and profitability of regulatory arbitrage in U.S. banks' foreign activities. I analyze a publicly available bank‐level data set on bilateral lending flows to 75 countries over 2003–2013. U.S. banks' affiliates lend less to borrowers in host countries with stricter bank capital regulations, and are less likely to maintain affiliates in such countries. Banks substitute from (host‐regulated) affiliate toward (U.S.‐regulated) cross‐border lending in hosts with strict bank capital rules. This is particularly so for low‐capitalized banks with lower foreign ownership shares. Banks that reduce their exposure to stricter host capital rules are more profitable in foreign activities. (JEL F3, F4, G2)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Judit Temesvary
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12579?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;I study the prevalence and profitability of regulatory arbitrage in U.S. banks' foreign activities. I analyze a publicly available bank‐level data set on bilateral lending flows to 75 countries over 2003–2013. U.S. banks' affiliates lend less to borrowers in host countries with stricter bank capital regulations, and are less likely to maintain affiliates in such countries. Banks substitute from (host‐regulated) affiliate toward (U.S.‐regulated) cross‐border lending in hosts with strict bank capital rules. This is particularly so for low‐capitalized banks with lower foreign ownership shares. Banks that reduce their exposure to stricter host capital rules are more profitable in foreign activities. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; F3, F4, G2)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 2077-2098, October 2018. </rss:description>
<dc:title>THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ARBITRAGE IN U.S. BANKS' INTERNATIONAL FLOWS: BANK‐LEVEL EVIDENCE</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12579</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-29T03:09:22-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:volume>56</prism:volume>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:coverDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12579</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12579?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12583?af=R">
<rss:title>THE IMPACT OF PERCEIVED BACKGROUND RISK ON BEHAVIORAL HEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM HURRICANE KATRINA</rss:title>
<dc:description>
I explore the hypothesis that Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 raised perceived background risks, which had spillover effects on behavioral health outcomes of mental health and substance use. I estimate the effect that Katrina had in the nondamaged storm surge region, in time intervals leading up to and after the hurricane, compared to areas impervious to hurricanes. I find causal evidence that Katrina increased poor mental health days by 18.8% for the first month after Katrina, and increased smoking among lifetime smokers until 2007. Effects were larger in counties with disproportionate risk to storm surge and for low‐educated individuals. (JEL D81, I12, Q54)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Michael F. Pesko
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12583?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;I explore the hypothesis that Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 raised perceived background risks, which had spillover effects on behavioral health outcomes of mental health and substance use. I estimate the effect that Katrina had in the nondamaged storm surge region, in time intervals leading up to and after the hurricane, compared to areas impervious to hurricanes. I find causal evidence that Katrina increased poor mental health days by 18.8% for the first month after Katrina, and increased smoking among lifetime smokers until 2007. Effects were larger in counties with disproportionate risk to storm surge and for low‐educated individuals. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; D81, I12, Q54)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 2099-2115, October 2018. </rss:description>
<dc:title>THE IMPACT OF PERCEIVED BACKGROUND RISK ON BEHAVIORAL HEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM HURRICANE KATRINA</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12583</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-29T03:09:22-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:volume>56</prism:volume>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:coverDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12583</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12583?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12704?af=R">
<rss:title>Economic Inquiry 2017 Editor's Report</rss:title>
<dc:description/>
<dc:creator>
Wesley W. Wilson
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12704?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded/>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 2242-2248, October 2018. </rss:description>
<dc:title>Economic Inquiry 2017 Editor's Report</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12704</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-29T03:09:22-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:volume>56</prism:volume>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:coverDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12704</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12704?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Editor's Report</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12510?af=R">
<rss:title>Issue Information</rss:title>
<dc:description/>
<dc:creator/>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12510?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded/>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 1925-1931, October 2018. </rss:description>
<dc:title>Issue Information</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12510</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-29T03:09:22-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:volume>56</prism:volume>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:coverDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>2018-10-01T07:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12510</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12510?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Issue Information</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12706?af=R">
<rss:title>RELEASING THE TRAP: A METHOD TO REDUCE INATTENTION BIAS IN SURVEY DATA WITH APPLICATION TO U.S. BEER TAXES</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This study uses discrete choice experiments to explore the efficacy of prompts targeted at reducing inattention bias. Upon receiving feedback, inattentive respondents are given the opportunity to reanswer a so‐called “trap question” that checks for attentiveness. We find that individuals who miss trap questions and do not correctly revise their responses have significantly different choice patterns as compared to individuals who correctly answer the trap question. Adjusting for these inattentive responses has a substantive impact on policy impacts. Results, based on attentive participant responses, indicate that a minimum beer price would have to be substantial to substantially reduce beer demand. (JEL C83, Q18, Q51)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Trey Malone,
Jayson L. Lusk
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12706?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This study uses discrete choice experiments to explore the efficacy of prompts targeted at reducing inattention bias. Upon receiving feedback, inattentive respondents are given the opportunity to reanswer a so‐called “trap question” that checks for attentiveness. We find that individuals who miss trap questions and do not correctly revise their responses have significantly different choice patterns as compared to individuals who correctly answer the trap question. Adjusting for these inattentive responses has a substantive impact on policy impacts. Results, based on attentive participant responses, indicate that a minimum beer price would have to be substantial to substantially reduce beer demand. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C83, Q18, Q51)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>RELEASING THE TRAP: A METHOD TO REDUCE INATTENTION BIAS IN SURVEY DATA WITH APPLICATION TO U.S. BEER TAXES</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12706</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-22T12:53:16-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12706</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12706?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12707?af=R">
<rss:title>COLLABORATE OR CONSOLIDATE: ASSESSING THE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF PRODUCTION JOINT VENTURES</rss:title>
<dc:description>
We analyze collaborations in which two firms facing external competition reorganize to form an input joint venture as an alternative to horizontal merger. Under standard regularity conditions, the collaboration can lead to higher profits than a horizontal merger, though the effect on prices, quantities, and welfare depends on the form of downstream competition. In light of our results regarding profits, we provide reasons why firms might still wish to merge: imperfect information, cost synergies, and organizational asymmetries. We further consider how our comparisons change with the managerial structure of the joint venture (i.e., by delegation of input pricing). (JEL L13, L23, L42)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Nicolas Aguelakakis,
Aleksandr Yankelevich
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12707?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;We analyze collaborations in which two firms facing external competition reorganize to form an input joint venture as an alternative to horizontal merger. Under standard regularity conditions, the collaboration can lead to higher profits than a horizontal merger, though the effect on prices, quantities, and welfare depends on the form of downstream competition. In light of our results regarding profits, we provide reasons why firms might still wish to merge: imperfect information, cost synergies, and organizational asymmetries. We further consider how our comparisons change with the managerial structure of the joint venture (i.e., by delegation of input pricing). (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; L13, L23, L42)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>COLLABORATE OR CONSOLIDATE: ASSESSING THE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF PRODUCTION JOINT VENTURES</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12707</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-20T03:55:20-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12707</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12707?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12705?af=R">
<rss:title>FROM HONEYMOON TO DIVORCE: INSTITUTION QUALITY AND FOREIGN INVESTORS' OWNERSHIP CONSOLIDATION IN CHINA</rss:title>
<dc:description>
In China, joint ventures (JVs) between foreign investors and Chinese local firms were the most popular form of foreign affiliates before 2001. Over time, with policy space to operate as foreign wholly owned (WOs), many foreign investors in JVs chose to consolidate ownership and turned JVs into their WOs. Here, we examine how institution quality affects foreign investors' JV‐to‐WO ownership consolidation odds. For each province‐year, we construct an institution quality index from the business and judicial quality indicators, and further compute a relative quality index to highlight provincial variations. Using more than 43,000 JVs operating in China's 30 provinces over 1998–2007, we find that increases in institution quality decrease the odds of foreign investors to divorce their Chinese local partners. The odds for foreign investors in JVs to consolidate ownerships are significantly higher if they operate in provinces with relatively weaker institution quality. The odds of foreign investors' JV‐to‐WO decision vary with JVs' local firms being state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and non‐SOEs, with foreign investors' origins from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (HMT) and other regions (Foreign), and with foreign investors' initial equity positions. Our results are not driven by foreign direct investment policy shocks, and are robust to alternative measures of institution quality. (JEL F23, L23)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Qun Bao,
Yanling Wang,
Hongjun Xie
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12705?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;In China, joint ventures (JVs) between foreign investors and Chinese local firms were the most popular form of foreign affiliates before 2001. Over time, with policy space to operate as foreign wholly owned (WOs), many foreign investors in JVs chose to consolidate ownership and turned JVs into their WOs. Here, we examine how &lt;i&gt;institution quality&lt;/i&gt; affects foreign investors' JV‐to‐WO ownership consolidation odds. For each province‐year, we construct an institution quality index from the business and judicial quality indicators, and further compute a &lt;i&gt;relative&lt;/i&gt; quality index to highlight provincial variations. Using more than 43,000 JVs operating in China's 30 provinces over 1998–2007, we find that increases in institution quality decrease the odds of foreign investors to divorce their Chinese local partners. The odds for foreign investors in JVs to consolidate ownerships are significantly higher if they operate in provinces with relatively &lt;i&gt;weaker&lt;/i&gt; institution quality. The odds of foreign investors' JV‐to‐WO decision vary with JVs' local firms being state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and non‐SOEs, with foreign investors' origins from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (HMT) and other regions (Foreign), and with foreign investors' initial equity positions. Our results are not driven by foreign direct investment policy shocks, and are robust to alternative measures of institution quality. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; F23, L23)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>FROM HONEYMOON TO DIVORCE: INSTITUTION QUALITY AND FOREIGN INVESTORS' OWNERSHIP CONSOLIDATION IN CHINA</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12705</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-20T03:44:48-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12705</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12705?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12702?af=R">
<rss:title>WINNING IN PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS: HISTORICAL MOMENTS</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Our aims in this paper are to (1) examine the higher moments of the distribution of winning percentages and (2) discover economic implications of such an examination. The results prove useful to both current sports league policy questions and future research. We speculate that the institutional differences between North American pro leagues and European soccer leagues will prove fruitful areas for future research on the determination of competitive balance. (JEL C1, L83, Z20)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Hayley Jang,
Young Hoon Lee,
Rodney Fort
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12702?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Our aims in this paper are to (1) examine the higher moments of the distribution of winning percentages and (2) discover economic implications of such an examination. The results prove useful to both current sports league policy questions and future research. We speculate that the institutional differences between North American pro leagues and European soccer leagues will prove fruitful areas for future research on the determination of competitive balance. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C1, L83, Z20)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>WINNING IN PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS: HISTORICAL MOMENTS</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12702</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-08-06T12:38:58-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12702</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12702?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12700?af=R">
<rss:title>ANTI‐POACHING AGREEMENTS IN LABOR MARKETS</rss:title>
<dc:description>
We analyze competition for experienced workers among wage‐setting firms. The firms can design poaching offers with higher wages to workers who switch from rivals relative to wages paid to their own existing employees. We evaluate the profit and welfare effects of anti‐poaching agreements that eliminate poaching offers as a recruiting method. Anti‐poaching agreements increase industry profits, whereas workers are made worse off. We show that the effects of anti‐poaching agreements on total welfare are determined by the magnitude of workers' switching costs and the productivity change associated with switching employers. (JEL L41, L40, J42)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Oz Shy,
Rune Stenbacka
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12700?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;We analyze competition for experienced workers among wage‐setting firms. The firms can design poaching offers with higher wages to workers who switch from rivals relative to wages paid to their own existing employees. We evaluate the profit and welfare effects of anti‐poaching agreements that eliminate poaching offers as a recruiting method. Anti‐poaching agreements increase industry profits, whereas workers are made worse off. We show that the effects of anti‐poaching agreements on total welfare are determined by the magnitude of workers' switching costs and the productivity change associated with switching employers. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; L41, L40, J42)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>ANTI‐POACHING AGREEMENTS IN LABOR MARKETS</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12700</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-07-28T01:54:34-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12700</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12700?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Manuscript</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12701?af=R">
<rss:title>INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF EURO AREA VERSUS U.S. POLICY UNCERTAINTY: A FAVAR APPROACH</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Estimating a large‐scale factor‐augmented vector autoregressive model for 18 Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development member countries, we quantify the global effects of economic policy uncertainty shocks. More specifically, we check whether the signs, the magnitude, and the persistence profile are consistent with the literature on the real and financial sector effects of uncertainty. In that respect, we compare the impacts of a U.S. and a Euro area policy uncertainty shock. According to our results, an increase in economic policy uncertainty has a strong negative impact on economic activity (gross domestic product), consumer prices, equity prices, and interest rates. Uncertainty shocks cause deeper recessions in Continental Europe (except Germany) than in Anglo‐Saxon countries. U.S. uncertainty shocks have a bigger impact than those for the Euro area. Economic policy uncertainty does not only affect that country where the shock originates but also has large cross‐border effects. We also find a high degree of synchronization among the responses of national variables to a (foreign) uncertainty shock, indicating evidence of an international business cycle. With respect to the responses of national long‐term interest rates to an economic policy uncertainty shock, our results reveal a strong “North‐South” divide within the Euro area with rates decreasing less significantly in the South. Moreover, economic policy uncertainty shocks emerging in one region quickly raise uncertainty outside the region of origin. (JEL C32, F42, D80)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Ansgar Belke,
Thomas Osowski
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12701?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Estimating a large‐scale factor‐augmented vector autoregressive model for 18 Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development member countries, we quantify the global effects of economic policy uncertainty shocks. More specifically, we check whether the signs, the magnitude, and the persistence profile are consistent with the literature on the real and financial sector effects of uncertainty. In that respect, we compare the impacts of a U.S. and a Euro area policy uncertainty shock. According to our results, an increase in economic policy uncertainty has a strong negative impact on economic activity (gross domestic product), consumer prices, equity prices, and interest rates. Uncertainty shocks cause deeper recessions in Continental Europe (except Germany) than in Anglo‐Saxon countries. U.S. uncertainty shocks have a bigger impact than those for the Euro area. Economic policy uncertainty does not only affect that country where the shock originates but also has large cross‐border effects. We also find a high degree of synchronization among the responses of national variables to a (foreign) uncertainty shock, indicating evidence of an international business cycle. With respect to the responses of national long‐term interest rates to an economic policy uncertainty shock, our results reveal a strong “North‐South” divide within the Euro area with rates decreasing less significantly in the South. Moreover, economic policy uncertainty shocks emerging in one region quickly raise uncertainty outside the region of origin. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C32, F42, D80)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF EURO AREA VERSUS U.S. POLICY UNCERTAINTY: A FAVAR APPROACH</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12701</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-07-28T12:19:59-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12701</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12701?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12703?af=R">
<rss:title>IS MORE COMPETITION ALWAYS BETTER? AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF EXTORTIONARY CORRUPTION</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Using a laboratory experiment, we assess whether increasing competition among public officials reduces extortionary corruption. We find that increasing the number of providers has no effect on bribe demands when citizens' search costs are high, but it increases corruption when search costs are low. The effect is absent in a parallel setting framed as a standard market, which we attribute to citizens using a nonsequential search strategy as opposed to sequential search in the corruption setting. We conclude that efforts to reduce search costs, such as infrastructure investments, are preferable to anti‐corruption policies aimed at increasing the number of providers. (JEL D73, D49, C91)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Dmitry Ryvkin,
Danila Serra
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12703?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Using a laboratory experiment, we assess whether increasing competition among public officials reduces extortionary corruption. We find that increasing the number of providers has no effect on bribe demands when citizens' search costs are high, but it increases corruption when search costs are low. The effect is absent in a parallel setting framed as a standard market, which we attribute to citizens using a nonsequential search strategy as opposed to sequential search in the corruption setting. We conclude that efforts to reduce search costs, such as infrastructure investments, are preferable to anti‐corruption policies aimed at increasing the number of providers. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; D73, D49, C91)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>IS MORE COMPETITION ALWAYS BETTER? AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF EXTORTIONARY CORRUPTION</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12703</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-07-27T09:49:57-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12703</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12703?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12693?af=R">
<rss:title>TO “VAPE” OR SMOKE? EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON ADULT SMOKERS</rss:title>
<dc:description>
A growing share of the U.S. population uses e‐cigarettes but the optimal regulation of these controversial products remains an open question. We conduct a discrete choice experiment to investigate how adult tobacco cigarette smokers' demand for e‐cigarettes and tobacco cigarettes varies by four attributes: (1) whether e‐cigarettes are considered healthier than tobacco cigarettes, (2) the effectiveness of e‐cigarettes as a cessation device, (3) bans on use in public places, and (4) price. We find that adult smokers' demand for e‐cigarettes is motivated more by health concerns than by the desire to avoid smoking bans or higher prices. (JEL C35, I12, I18)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Joachim Marti,
John Buckell,
Johanna Catherine Maclean,
Jody Sindelar
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12693?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;A growing share of the U.S. population uses e‐cigarettes but the optimal regulation of these controversial products remains an open question. We conduct a discrete choice experiment to investigate how adult tobacco cigarette smokers' demand for e‐cigarettes and tobacco cigarettes varies by four attributes: (1) whether e‐cigarettes are considered healthier than tobacco cigarettes, (2) the effectiveness of e‐cigarettes as a cessation device, (3) bans on use in public places, and (4) price. We find that adult smokers' demand for e‐cigarettes is motivated more by health concerns than by the desire to avoid smoking bans or higher prices. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C35, I12, I18)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>TO “VAPE” OR SMOKE? EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON ADULT SMOKERS</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12693</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-07-18T11:54:51-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12693</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12693?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Manuscript</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12695?af=R">
<rss:title>ASSET PRICE BUBBLES AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION</rss:title>
<dc:description>
We introduce borrowing constraints into a two‐sector Schumpeterian growth model and examine the impact of asset price bubbles on innovation. In this environment, rational bubbles arise when the intermediate good producing R&amp;amp;D sector is faced with adverse productivity shocks. Importantly, these bubbles help alleviate credit constraints and facilitate innovation in the stagnant economy. On the policy front, we make a case for debt financed credit to the R&amp;amp;D sector. Further, we establish that a constant credit growth rule (akin to the Friedman rule) outperforms the often prescribed counter‐cyclical “lean against the wind” credit policy. (JEL E32, E44, O40)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Jong Kook Shin,
Chetan Subramanian
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12695?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;We introduce borrowing constraints into a two‐sector Schumpeterian growth model and examine the impact of asset price bubbles on innovation. In this environment, rational bubbles arise when the intermediate good producing R&amp;D sector is faced with &lt;i&gt;adverse&lt;/i&gt; productivity shocks. Importantly, these bubbles help alleviate credit constraints and facilitate innovation in the stagnant economy. On the policy front, we make a case for debt financed credit to the R&amp;D sector. Further, we establish that a constant credit growth rule (akin to the Friedman rule) outperforms the often prescribed counter‐cyclical “lean against the wind” credit policy. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; E32, E44, O40)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>ASSET PRICE BUBBLES AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12695</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-07-16T11:54:45-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12695</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12695?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12694?af=R">
<rss:title>REDUCING PUBLIC‐PRIVATE SECTOR PAY DIFFERENTIALS: THE SINGLE SPINE PAY POLICY AS A NATURAL EXPERIMENT IN GHANA</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Empirical studies have documented the existence of the public‐private pay differentials in both developed and developing countries. The implementation of policies aiming to reduce this gap has however been mitigated or inconclusive. This paper exploits the Single Spine Pay Policy (SSPP) in Ghana as a natural experiment to examine the effectiveness of wage policies in developing countries. The SSPP was implemented in 2010 by the Government of Ghana to address the public‐private sector wage gap and improve productivity in the public sector. Using a quantile treatment effect approach based on a difference‐in‐difference estimation, we show that the SSPP has yet to reduce the wage gap between the public and private sectors across the entire distribution of earnings in Ghana. The improvement observed is only at the lower tail of the distribution of earnings. However, the SSPP has a larger effect on the earnings of female workers than that of males in the education and health services sectors while male workers have benefited more in the administration sector, suggesting that the policy was successful in reducing the gender wage gap in the education and health services sectors but has widened this gap in the administration sector. Moreover, the SSPP has decreased the productivity of workers across the distribution of earnings, mainly due to a decrease in the effort of female public sector workers in the education and health sectors and male workers in the administration sector. (JEL C31, G15, J24, J31, J45)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Akwasi Ampofo,
Firmin Doko Tchatoka
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12694?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Empirical studies have documented the existence of the public‐private pay differentials in both developed and developing countries. The implementation of policies aiming to reduce this gap has however been mitigated or inconclusive. This paper exploits the Single Spine Pay Policy (SSPP) in Ghana as a natural experiment to examine the effectiveness of wage policies in developing countries. The SSPP was implemented in 2010 by the Government of Ghana to address the public‐private sector wage gap and improve productivity in the public sector. Using a quantile treatment effect approach based on a difference‐in‐difference estimation, we show that the SSPP has yet to reduce the wage gap between the public and private sectors across the entire distribution of earnings in Ghana. The improvement observed is only at the lower tail of the distribution of earnings. However, the SSPP has a larger effect on the earnings of female workers than that of males in the education and health services sectors while male workers have benefited more in the administration sector, suggesting that the policy was successful in reducing the gender wage gap in the education and health services sectors but has widened this gap in the administration sector. Moreover, the SSPP has decreased the productivity of workers across the distribution of earnings, mainly due to a decrease in the effort of female public sector workers in the education and health sectors and male workers in the administration sector. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C31, G15, J24, J31, J45)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>REDUCING PUBLIC‐PRIVATE SECTOR PAY DIFFERENTIALS: THE SINGLE SPINE PAY POLICY AS A NATURAL EXPERIMENT IN GHANA</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12694</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-07-11T10:35:30-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12694</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12694?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12691?af=R">
<rss:title>SMALL‐ AND MEDIUM‐SIZED ENTERPRISE FINANCING AND SECURITIZATION: FIRM‐LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM THE EURO AREA</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This paper analyzes the impact of securitization on access to finance for small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) in the euro area. Using firm‐level survey data on SME financing conditions, we show that an increase in securitization issuance reduces the probability of SMEs facing credit constraints and decreases the costs of bank financing for nonconstrained firms. Our results reveal that in addition to the volume of securitization, its type and quality matter for credit extension to SMEs. The paper thus provides empirical support for recent initiatives to revive securitization in Europe and for effective monetary policy transmission in the euro area. (JEL D22, E44, E51, E58, G21)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Orçun Kaya,
Oliver Masetti
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12691?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This paper analyzes the impact of securitization on access to finance for small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) in the euro area. Using firm‐level survey data on SME financing conditions, we show that an increase in securitization issuance reduces the probability of SMEs facing credit constraints and decreases the costs of bank financing for nonconstrained firms. Our results reveal that in addition to the volume of securitization, its type and quality matter for credit extension to SMEs. The paper thus provides empirical support for recent initiatives to revive securitization in Europe and for effective monetary policy transmission in the euro area. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; D22, E44, E51, E58, G21)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>SMALL‐ AND MEDIUM‐SIZED ENTERPRISE FINANCING AND SECURITIZATION: FIRM‐LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM THE EURO AREA</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12691</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-06-12T12:32:21-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12691</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12691?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Manuscript</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12690?af=R">
<rss:title>QUANTITATIVE EASING AND THE UK STOCK MARKET: DOES THE BANK OF ENGLAND INFORMATION DISSEMINATION STRATEGY MATTER?</rss:title>
<dc:description>
We use intraday aggregate stock market data and an event‐study framework to assess the UK's equity market reaction to the unexpected element of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee's (MPC) asset purchase announcements for the 2009–2017 period. We assess the reactions of equity returns and their volatility over various time frames, both preceding and following the MPC announcements. Our results show that the UK unconventional monetary policy shocks have a significant impact on domestic equity returns and volatilities. The strength of this impact depends on the Bank's information dissemination through inflation reports and the publication of the MPC's voting records. (JEL G14, E44, E52)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Georgios Chortareas,
Menelaos Karanasos,
Emmanouil Noikokyris
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12690?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;We use intraday aggregate stock market data and an event‐study framework to assess the UK's equity market reaction to the unexpected element of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee's (MPC) asset purchase announcements for the 2009–2017 period. We assess the reactions of equity returns and their volatility over various time frames, both preceding and following the MPC announcements. Our results show that the UK unconventional monetary policy shocks have a significant impact on domestic equity returns and volatilities. The strength of this impact depends on the Bank's information dissemination through inflation reports and the publication of the MPC's voting records. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; G14, E44, E52)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>QUANTITATIVE EASING AND THE UK STOCK MARKET: DOES THE BANK OF ENGLAND INFORMATION DISSEMINATION STRATEGY MATTER?</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12690</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-06-12T12:30:58-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12690</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12690?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12586?af=R">
<rss:title>WORK HOUR MISMATCH AND JOB MOBILITY: ADJUSTMENT CHANNELS AND RESOLUTION RATES</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This paper analyses the role of job changes in overcoming work hour mismatches (i.e., differences between actual and desired work hours). It addresses two, yet neglected, questions: (1) How do adjustments in desired work hours, additionally to adjustments in actual work hours, contribute to the resolution of these mismatches? and (2) Does the well‐documented increased work hour flexibility of job movers help to actually resolve work hour mismatches? We find that job change increases the probability of resolving work hour mismatches, but far less than expected with free choice of hours across jobs. (JEL J21, J22)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Michael C. Knaus,
Steffen Otterbach
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12586?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This paper analyses the role of job changes in overcoming work hour mismatches (i.e., differences between actual and desired work hours). It addresses two, yet neglected, questions: (1) How do adjustments in desired work hours, additionally to adjustments in actual work hours, contribute to the resolution of these mismatches? and (2) Does the well‐documented increased work hour flexibility of job movers help to actually resolve work hour mismatches? We find that job change increases the probability of resolving work hour mismatches, but far less than expected with free choice of hours across jobs. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; J21, J22)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>WORK HOUR MISMATCH AND JOB MOBILITY: ADJUSTMENT CHANNELS AND RESOLUTION RATES</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12586</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-04-20T12:00:12-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12586</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12586?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12581?af=R">
<rss:title>DOES FINANCE ALTER THE RELATION BETWEEN INEQUALITY AND GROWTH?</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This paper introduces a model in which greater inequality reduces growth in economies with low levels of financial development but that this effect is attenuated in economies with more developed systems. The model also predicts that individuals in economies with developed financial markets have a higher tolerance to inequality. Using a panel dataset that covers a large number of countries, this paper shows empirical evidence that is consistent with the main predictions of the model. Overall, this paper's major findings highlight that some of the pernicious effects of inequality can be attenuated by improving access to credit. (JEL D3, E6, P1, O4, I2)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Matías Braun,
Francisco Parro,
Patricio Valenzuela
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12581?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This paper introduces a model in which greater inequality reduces growth in economies with low levels of financial development but that this effect is attenuated in economies with more developed systems. The model also predicts that individuals in economies with developed financial markets have a higher tolerance to inequality. Using a panel dataset that covers a large number of countries, this paper shows empirical evidence that is consistent with the main predictions of the model. Overall, this paper's major findings highlight that some of the pernicious effects of inequality can be attenuated by improving access to credit. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; D3, E6, P1, O4, I2)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>DOES FINANCE ALTER THE RELATION BETWEEN INEQUALITY AND GROWTH?</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12581</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-04-19T11:55:28-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12581</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12581?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12585?af=R">
<rss:title>ALL‐PAY AUCTIONS WITH A BUY‐PRICE OPTION</rss:title>
<dc:description>
This paper studies all‐pay auctions in which there is a buy‐price option for bidders to guarantee purchases at a seller‐specified price. We analyze symmetric increasing bidding equilibria in the first‐ and second‐price all‐pay auctions with the buy‐price option. While the optimal buy‐price in the second price is higher than are those in the first‐price all‐pay auction, both formats maintain the same expected profit. With an endogenous entry process, all‐pay auctions with the buy‐price can attract more consumers and ultimately reach a higher expected profit than does the uniform posted‐price selling mechanism. (JEL D44, L11, L81)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Minbo Xu,
Sanxi Li,
Jianye Yan
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12585?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;This paper studies all‐pay auctions in which there is a buy‐price option for bidders to guarantee purchases at a seller‐specified price. We analyze symmetric increasing bidding equilibria in the first‐ and second‐price all‐pay auctions with the buy‐price option. While the optimal buy‐price in the second price is higher than are those in the first‐price all‐pay auction, both formats maintain the same expected profit. With an endogenous entry process, all‐pay auctions with the buy‐price can attract more consumers and ultimately reach a higher expected profit than does the uniform posted‐price selling mechanism. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; D44, L11, L81)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>ALL‐PAY AUCTIONS WITH A BUY‐PRICE OPTION</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12585</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-04-19T09:07:27-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12585</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12585?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12575?af=R">
<rss:title>FOSTERING THE BEST EXECUTION REGIME: AN EXPERIMENT ABOUT PECUNIARY SANCTIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN FIDUCIARY MONEY MANAGEMENT</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Asset management often involves a conflict of interests between investors and fund managers. A main goal of financial regulators is to identify and mitigate this conflict. This article focuses on measures that may foster protection of investors' interests. In an experiment capturing the essential elements of asset management, we find that managers' accountability does not prevent their opportunistic behavior if not backed by a threat of punishment. Further, investors inefficiently sanction managers if not completely aware of managers' choices. To effectively protect investors in financial intermediations, financial regulators should ensure both managers' accountability and a credible sanctioning system.
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Sandro Casal,
Matteo Ploner,
Alec N. Sproten
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12575?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Asset management often involves a conflict of interests between investors and fund managers. A main goal of financial regulators is to identify and mitigate this conflict. This article focuses on measures that may foster protection of investors' interests. In an experiment capturing the essential elements of asset management, we find that managers' accountability does not prevent their opportunistic behavior if not backed by a threat of punishment. Further, investors inefficiently sanction managers if not completely aware of managers' choices. To effectively protect investors in financial intermediations, financial regulators should ensure both managers' accountability and a credible sanctioning system.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>FOSTERING THE BEST EXECUTION REGIME: AN EXPERIMENT ABOUT PECUNIARY SANCTIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN FIDUCIARY MONEY MANAGEMENT</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12575</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2018-03-24T07:45:48-07:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12575</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12575?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12542?af=R">
<rss:title>YOUR LANGUAGE OR MINE? THE NONCOMMUNICATIVE BENEFITS OF LANGUAGE SKILLS</rss:title>
<dc:description>
Do languages matter beyond their communicative benefits? We explore the potential role of preferences over the language of use, theoretically and empirically. We focus on Catalonia, a bilingual society where everyone is fully proficient in Spanish, to isolate linguistic preferences from communicative benefits. Moreover, we exploit the language‐in‐education reform of 1983 to identify the causal effects of language skills. Results indicate that the policy change has improved the Catalan proficiency of native Spanish speakers, which in turn increased their propensity to find Catalan‐speaking partners. Hence, the acquisition of apparently redundant language skills has reduced endogamy. (JEL C26, C78, I28, J12, J15, Z13)
</dc:description>
<dc:creator>
Ramon Caminal,
Antonio Di Paolo
</dc:creator>
<rss:link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12542?af=R</rss:link>
<content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Do languages matter beyond their communicative benefits? We explore the potential role of preferences over the language of use, theoretically and empirically. We focus on Catalonia, a bilingual society where everyone is fully proficient in Spanish, to isolate linguistic preferences from communicative benefits. Moreover, we exploit the language‐in‐education reform of 1983 to identify the causal effects of language skills. Results indicate that the policy change has improved the Catalan proficiency of native Spanish speakers, which in turn increased their propensity to find Catalan‐speaking partners. Hence, the acquisition of apparently redundant language skills has reduced endogamy. (&lt;i&gt;JEL&lt;/i&gt; C26, C78, I28, J12, J15, Z13)&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
<rss:description>Economic Inquiry, EarlyView. </rss:description>
<dc:title>YOUR LANGUAGE OR MINE? THE NONCOMMUNICATIVE BENEFITS OF LANGUAGE SKILLS</dc:title>
<dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/ecin.12542</dc:identifier>
<dc:source>Economic Inquiry</dc:source>
<dc:date>2017-12-18T12:00:00-08:00</dc:date>
<prism:publicationName>Economic Inquiry</prism:publicationName>
<prism:doi>10.1111/ecin.12542</prism:doi>
<prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecin.12542?af=R</prism:url>
<prism:copyright/>
<prism:section>Original Article</prism:section>
</rss:item>
</rdf:RDF>
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