Attack vector | What phishers try | How passkeys stop them | Technical reason |
---|---|---|---|
Fake domain / look-alike site | Lure user to compannyy.com and steal typed credentials |
No credentials to steal – the browser/OS will not present the passkey unless the domain exactly matches the one registered (company.com ) . |
|
Man-in-the-middle / proxy phishing | Intercept login traffic between user and real site | Verifier-name binding – the cryptographic assertion contains the site’s hostname & origin; if they don’t match, the signature is rejected . | |
Credential replay | Capture and reuse a one-time code or cookie | Asymmetric challenge-response – each login uses a fresh signature that is useless to replay; there is no static secret on the server . | |
Cross-device phishing | Trick user into approving a login on a remote machine | Proximity check – cross-device authentication uses Bluetooth Low Energy (or USB/NFC) to ensure the authenticating phone/key is physically nearby the requesting device . | |
Server breach | Steal stored authentication secrets | No shared secrets – only the public key is stored server-side; the private key never leaves the user’s secure enclave . |
Last active
July 16, 2025 16:10
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How passkeys block phishing attacks
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